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ABSTRACT
This volume of Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety contains the Design and Operations
Guidelines and Requirements developed in the study of Space Base Nuclear System Safety.
Guidelines and Requirements are presented for the Space Base Subsystems, nuclear hard-
ware (reactor, isotope sources, dynamic generator equipment), experiments, interfacing
vehicles, ground support systems, range safety and facilities. Cross indices and references
are provided which relate guidelines to each other, and to substantiating data in other volumes.
The guidelines are intended for the implementation of nuclear safety related design and
operational considerations in future space programs.
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FOREWORD i
The establishment and operation of large manned space facilities in earth orbit would consti-
tute a significant step forward in space. Such long duration programs with orbital stay times
of up to ten years would benefit the earth's populace and the scientific community by provid-
ing:
1. A flexible tool for scientific research.
2. A permanent base for earth oriented applications.
3. A foundation for the future exploration of our universe.
Specifically, the NASA objectives include earth surveys and scientific disciplines of astron-
omy, bioscience, chemistry, physics and biomedicine, as well as the development of tech-
nology for space and earth applications.
Operational and design requirements, of large manned space vehicles, differ from those of
the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Of particular interest are the radiation sur-
vivability and nuclear safety requirements imposed by nuclear power reactors and isotopes
and the long term interaction with the natural radiation environment.
The General Electric Company under contract to NASA-MSFC (NAS8-26283) has performed
a study entitled "Space Base Nuclear System Safety" for the express purposes of addressing
the nuclear considerations involved in manned earth orbital missions. The study addresses
both operational and general earth populace and ecological nuclear safety aspects. The pri-
mary objective is to identify and evaluate the potential and inherent radiological hazards as-
sociated with such missions and recommend approaches for hazard elimination or reduction
of risk.
Work performed utilized the Phase A Space Base designs developed for NASA by North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas as baseline documentation.
The study was sponsored jointly by NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, Office of Ad-
vanced Research and Technology, and Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. It was
performed for NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center under the direction of Mr.
Walter H. Stafford of the Advanced Systems Analysis Office. He was assisted by a joint NASA
and AEC advisory group, chaired by Mr. Herbert Schaefer of NASA's Office of Manned Space
Flight.
The results of the study are presented in seven volumes, the titles of which are listed in
Table A. A cross-reference matrix of the subjects covered in the various volumes is pre-
sented in Table B.
Table A. Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety Documentation
Volume
I
Part 1
Part 2
II
Part 1
Part 1A
III
Part 1
Part 2
Part 2 A
Part 3
IV
Part 1
Part 2
V
Part 1
Part 2
VI
VII
Part 1
Part 2
Executive Summary
Space Base Nuclear Safety
Space Shuttle Nuclear Safety
Space Base Preliminary Nuclear Safety Analysis
Nuclear Safety Analysis
Appendix-Alternate Reactor Data (CRD)
Reactor System Preliminary Nuclear Safety Analysis
Reference Design Document (RDD)
Accident Model Document (AMD)
Accident Model Document - Appendix
Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)
Space Shuttle Nuclear System Transportation
Space Shuttle Nuclear Safety
Terrestrial Nuclear Safety Analysis (C)
Nuclear System Safety Guidelines
Space Base Nuclear Safety
Space Shuttle/Nuclear Payloads Safety
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Literature Review
Literature Search and Evaluation
ASRDI Forms
Document No.
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72SD4201-3-3
72SD4201-4-1
72SD4201-4-2*
72SD4201-5-1
72SD4201-5-2
72SD4201-6
72SD4201-7-1
72SD4201-7-2*
Limited distribution
VI
This study employs the International system of units and where appropriate the equivalent
English units are specified in brackets. A list of Conversion Factors and a Glossary of
Terms is included in the back of each volume.
Table B. Study Area Cross Reference
* [7] PRIMARY DISCUSSION
(^) SUMMARY OR SUPPLEMENTAL
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•Section number is included where
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
KEY CONTRIBUTORS
E.E. GERRELS
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
The guidelines and requirements developed during the study of Space Base Nuclear System Safety
are presented in this Volume. Each guideline describes a design or operational feature which,
if implemented, would alleviate or minimize a particular hazard(s) and thereby increase the
safety and success of the mission.
A major distinction has been made between a guideline and a requirement. A requirement
is only noted as such if it has been classified as a mandatory provision under all circumstances.
When any doubt exists, when alternative measures can be taken or when the provision increases
the safety of the mission, but may not be required to accomplish the mission objectives, a
guideline notation has been given. A majority of the considerations presented fall into the
guideline category.
Guidelines prepared for the study of the transport of nuclear payloads to and from earth orbit
by the Space Shuttle are presented under separate cover - Volume V, Part 2.
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SECTION 2
GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS DESCRIPTION
KEY CONTRIBUTORS
E.E. GERRELS.
SECTION 2
GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS DESCRIPTION
Figure 2-1 shows the format used in reporting all guidelines. The content and use of the
format is discussed below.
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
TITLE I
PROGRAM ELEMENT I SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
MISSION PHASE ^V
STATEMENT
JUSTIFICATION
REMARKS
REFERENCES
DATE I NO.
JAN 72
OPERATION
HAZARD
CATEGORY
CROSS REFERENCES
Figure 2-1. Guideline Format
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2.1 NUMBER
The identifying alphanumerical designation consists of two letters followed by a three digit
number.
•Guideline (R - Requirement)
r Design Feature (O - Operations Feature)
y \ r Numerical Designator
The first alpha character denotes whether the statement is a guideline (G) or a mandatory
requirement (R). The second alpha character distinguishes between design considerations
(D) or operational procedures (O). Series 001 to 100 have been reserved for numerical
designation of the guidelines and requirements for the Space Base Nuclear System Safety
Study.
2.2 PROGRAM ELEMENT
The program element denotes the major vehicle/program for which the guideline is intended,
i.e., Space Base, Space Shuttle, Space Tug, Launch Vehicle, Launch Center, etc.
2.3 SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM GROUPING
Associated with each program element are various top level groupings of equipment designated
as Systems or Subsystems. The system/subsystem groupings designated for this study include
the following:
General
Space Base Subsystems
Interfacing Vehicles
(Shuttle, Tug, RNS, OPSD)
Ground Support (KSC)
Facilities
Range Safety
Mission Control Center (MCC)
Reactor Power Module (PM)
Isotopes
Dynamic Generator Equipment
Crew Protection
Communication & Data Management
Structures
Navigation and Control
Environmental Control & Life Support (EC/LS)
Experiments
2-2
2.4 OPERATION
The operation column is used to denote the particular operation or function to which the
guideline is directed. Typical operation categories are transportation, isotope cooling,
ground handling, rendezvous and docking, recovery, etc.
2.5 MISSION PHASE/EVENT
The phase or phases of the mission for which the guideline applies is listed. The various
phases of a Space Base mission are shown in Figure 2-2.
4 0 END OF MISSION
• POWER MODULE DISPOSAL
SEPARATION
TRANSFER TO HIGH OR8IT
• SPACE BASE CLOSEOUT
CONTINGENCY PLANS
RECOVERY
3 0 ORBITAL OPERATIONS
ORBITAL BUILDUP
CHECKOUT
START-UP
OPERATIONAL MODE
CONTINGENCY OPERATION
2 0 LAUNCH/ASCENT
LAUNCH
S-IC BOOST
S-ll BOOST
RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING
1 0 PRELALINCH
TRANSPORTATION
RECEIPT INSPECTION STORAGE |
CHECK OUT AND ASSEMBLY
INTEGRATION
COUNTDOWN
POWER MODULE -990 KM ORBIT
ISOTOPES RECOVERY
SHUTTLE
BUILD-UP 105 WEEKS
10YEAR MISSION
POWER MODULE REPLACEMENT - 5 YR
SHUTTLE RESUPPLY
EXPERIMENTATION
50 CREW (ART G AND ZERO G)
INTERFACING VEHICLE SUPPORT
:
INT 21 BOOSTER
SINGLE OR DUAL REACTOR LAUNCH
SHUTTLE SUPPORT LAUNCHES
500KMx55°OR3(P INCL ORBIT
EURASIAN OVERFLY
3 POWER MODULES AT KSC
90 DAY CHECKOUT PERIOD
COLD REACTOR
INTEGRATION LATE IN SEO
KSC COMPLEX 39
Figure 2-2. Space Base Mission Phases
2.6 TITLE
The title is provided to briefly identify the subject matter of the guideline. It is used in the
cross index along with the alphanumeric designation to provide the necessary descriptive
words to concisely identify the guideline and content.
2-3
2.7 STATEMENT
The statement contains the guideline, and is usually a brief statement, preferably one sentence,
which describes a suggested means by which a hazard may be alleviated or eliminated. All
statements for a particular Program/System form a useful checklist for a program manager «
or designer. Typical examples include:
• Provide a universal transporter in support of transportation and prelaunch activities
of a reactor power module.
• Locate laboratories using relatively large isotope tracer concentrations in zero-g
and possible isolatable and removable portions of a Space Base Vehicle.
• Provide for positive and permanent reactor shutdown prior to disposal or recovery.
• Restrict EVA during orbits intercepting the South Atlantic Anomaly.
2.8 JUSTIFICATION
The justification contains a brief substantiation for the guideline in terms of the nature of the
hazards presented. A hazard category column is provided to be used in conformance with the
hazard categories listed in NASA Office of Manned Space Flight Safety Program Directive No.
1 Revision A. Due to the preliminary nature of this study hazard categories were not assigned
to individual guidelines. However, this potential exists and should be reserved for subsequent
evaluations.
2.9 REMARKS
The remarks column is intended to provide additional information needed to further define the
guideline or to indicate techniques worthy of consideration which could be applied or are used
in existing systems.
2.10 REFERENCES
The key references (supporting data) in the study final reports or other related documents
which are used to arrive at the guidelines are listed.
2-4
2.11 CROSS REFERENCES
The cross reference column lists the related guidelines that should be referred to by the
user.
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SECTION 3
GUIDELINE USAGE
KEY CONTRIBUTORS
E.E. GERRELS
SECTION 3
GUIDELINE USAGE
This particular set of guidelines is intended for use by:
1. Manned Space Flight and Space Experiment Program/Design personnel in implementing
nuclear payload and nuclear safety operational and design considerations.
2. Nuclear Payload development personnel in implementing safety related design and
operational features for the reactor, isotope-Brayton and small isotope systems.
3. System safety personnel in planning, establishing priorities, directing and controlling
the safety program.
The guidelines can be used to establish requirements on future hardware design and development.
They can also be used as a checklist against a preliminary or final design. They also form the
basis of trade-off evaluations for the optimization of design when considering safety as related
to performance, cost, schedules, etc.
Safety guidelines impact design details, operations and procedures and in some instances can
be classified as key configuration drivers. It is important that safety guidelines be reviewed
at an early date for implementation in Manned Space Flight Programs. Early consideration and
implementation will result in a design capable of supporting nuclear hardware missions with
minimum perturbations on spacecraft systems and Ground Support.
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SECTION 4
GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS CROSS INDEX
KEY CONTRIBUTORS
E. E. GERRELS
SECTION 4
GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS CROSS INDEX
This section contains cross indices of all the guidelines and requirements developed.
4.1 HAZARD REDUCTION SEQUENCE INDEX
Table 4-1 contains a summary of the key guidelines in accordance with the hazard reduction
sequence of the OMSF Safety Program Directive No. 1, Revision 4. This hazard reduction
precedence sequence is as follows:
4.1.1 DESIGN FOR MINIMUM HAZARD
The major effort throughout the design phases shall be to insure inherent safety through the
selection of appropriate design features (e. g., fail safe design, redundancy, increased
ultimate safety factor).
4.1.2 SAFETY DEVICES
Known hazards which cannot be eliminated through design selection shall be reduced to the
acceptable level through the use of appropriate safety devices as part of the system, sub-
system, or equipment.
4.1.3 WARNING DEVICES
Where it is not possible to preclude the existence or occurrence of a known hazard, devices
shall be employed for the timely detection of the condition and the generation of an adequate
warning signal. Warning signals and their application shall be designed to minimize the
probability of wrong signals or of improper personnel reaction to the signals.
4.1.4 SPECIAL PROCEDURES
Where it is not possible to reduce the magnitude of an existing or potential hazard through
design, or the use of safety and warning devices, special procedures shall be developed to
counter hazardous conditions for enhancement of ground and flight crew safety. Precautionary
notations shall be standardized in accordance with the direction of the procuring activity.
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4.2 CROSS INDEX
The cross index of all the guidelines and requirements developed is contained in Table 4-2.
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Table 4-2. Cross Index of Guidelines
and Requirements
NUMBER
| REQUIREMENTS |
DESIGN
RD-001
RD-002
RD-003
RD-004
RD-005
RD-006
RD-007
RD-008
RD-009
RD-010
RD-011
OPERATIONS
RO-001
RO-002
RO-003
RO-004
HO-005
RO-006
RO-007
1 GUIDELINES
DESIGN
GD-001
GD-002
GD-003
GD-004
GD-005
GD-006
GD-007
GD-008
GD-009
GD-010
GD-011
GD-012
GD-013
GD-014
GD-015
GD-016
GD-017
GD-018
GD-019
GD-020
GD-021
GD-022
GD-023
GD-024
GD-025
GD-026
TITLE
REACTOR POWER MODULE SHIPPING & STORAGE CONTAINERS
REACTOR CONTROL DRUM LOCKOUT DEVICES
SAFING REACTOR IN QUASI-STEADY STATE CONDITION
SAFE DISPOSAL/RECOVERY OF REACTOR/SHIELD
REACTOR REENTRY AND IMPACT PROTECTION
REDUNDANT OR ALTERNATE MEANS OF DISPOSAL
ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE SHIPPING Si STORAGE CONTAINER DESIGN
HEAT SOURCE FUEL CAPSULE CONTAINMENT
FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION
ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE COOLING
PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY Si RADIATION MONITORING
STRICT ADHERENCE TO PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS
PERSONNEL LIMITATIONS it REGULATIONS
NUCLEAR HARDWARE STORAGE AND PACKING LIMITS
REACTOR DISPOSAL/RECOVERY
RETURN TO EARTH OF EXPERIMENT ISOTOPES
USE OF IMPACT/RECOVERY TEAM
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED AREAS
/
RADIATOR COOLANT FLUID SELECTION
REACTOR PM LIQUID METAL ENVIR PROTECTION
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT LAUNCH SD E
REACTOR DESIGN TO PRECLUDE CRITICALITY ACCIDENTS
REACTOR CONTROL DRUM POSITION INDICATORS
NaK LEAK CONTAINMENT
NaK COOLANT LEAK DETECTION
REACTOR PRIM LOOP Si INTERMEDIATE LOOP SEPARATION
REACTOR DISPOSAL ROCKETS Si COMP DESIGN FOR SEPARATE
INSTALLATION
PREVENTION OF NaK COOLANT LOOP FREEZE-UP
REACTOR TRACKING & IMPACT LOCATION DEVICES
INDEPENDENT REACTOR/SHIELD DECAY HEAT REMOVAL
GROUND CONTROL BACKUP OF REACTOR PM OPERATIONS
PRIMARY LOOP NaK COMPONENT LOCATION
POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM PLACEMENT
MULTIPLE POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM OPERATION
PRESSURIZED AND TEMPERATURE CONTROLLED ENGINE ROOM
USE OF MULTIPLE REDUNDANCY IN HIGH RADIATION AREAS
"BLACK BOX" MAINTENANCE FOR REPARABLE EQUIPMENT
NON-REPARABLE, REDUNDANT NaK LOOP DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
USE OF QUICK DISCONNECTS
PROTECTIVE SHIELDING AROUND DYNAMIC MACHINERY
HIGH TEMPERATURE Si ELECTRICAL HAZARD GUARDS
METEORITE & SPACE DEBRIS PROTECTION OF NaK LOOP
PLACEMENT OF REPARABLE COMPONENTS
PLACEMENT OF DISPOSAL SYSTEM ELECTRONICS
APPLICABLE SYSTEMS
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GD-027
GD-028
GD-029
GD-030
GD-031
GD-032
GD-033
GD-034
GD-035
GD-036
GD-037
GD-038
GD-039
GD-040
GD-041
GD-042
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GD-044
GD-045
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GD-048
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GD-050
GD-051
GD-052
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GD-061
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GD-067
GD-068
GD-069
GD-070
GD-071
GD-072
GD-073
GD-074
GD-075
GD-076
GD-077
TITLE
FAULT DIAGNOSIS BY GROUND SUPPORT
FAULT ISOLATION DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM
MODULAR REPLACEMENT OF DISPOSAL SYSTEM
DETECTION OF ABNORMAL RADIATION FROM REACTOR SHIELD
INSURE REACTOR NEUTRON SHIELD INTEGRITY
LiH SHIELD PUNCTURE DETECTION
REACTOR/SHIELD FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION
REACTOR SHIELD COOLING
POSITIVE Si PERMANENT REACTOR SHUTDOWN MECHANISM
RAPID RESPONSE PM EJECTION
POSITIVE MECHANICAL SEPARATION OF REACTOR PM
POSITIVE REACTOR SHUTDOWN MECHANISM
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SHUTDOWN MECHANISM
REACTOR SHIELD DOSE REQUIREMENTS (OPTIMIZATION)
REACTOR PM TELEMETRY TRACKING Si CONTROL
USE OF DEPLETED Pu-238
ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE SHIELDING
ISOTOPE INERT GAS BLANKET
ISOTOPE HANDLING TOOLS
FLOTATION GEAR FOR LARGE ISOTOPES
SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT PIECE PART SELECTION FOR
RADIATION MONITORING
COLLISION WARNING SYSTEM
USE OF NaK COMPATIBLE EVA SUIT
CREW SUITS IN PM ENGINE ROOM
STORM SHELTER PROVISIONS
LOCALIZED PROTECTION FOR THE EYES
ON-BOARD INDIVIDUAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING
CENTRAL ON-BOARD RAD WARNING SYSTEM
LASER BEAM PROTECTIVE DEVICES
AUXILIARY CREW SHIELDING WITH INTERFACING VEHICLE
SCREENING OF DOSE RATE SENSITIVE NAVIGATION Si CONTROL EQUIP
RAPID ORBIT ADJUST CAPABILITY
ON-BOARD SUPPORT OF RAD SAFETY PROGRAM
SEPARATE WASTE MGT SYSTEM FOR RAD WASTE
SEPARATE ATMOS CONTROL FOR LABS CONTAINING ISOTOPES & TRACERS
LOCALIZED RADIATION SHIELDING FOR ISOTOPE SOURCES
LOCATION OF ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCES
USE OF STRIPPABLE COATINGS
COMPARTMENT ISOLATION/EJECTION
USE OF NaK COMPATIBLE STRUCTURAL MATERIAL
COATING OF STRUCTURES FOR NaK COMPATIBILITY
STORAGE 6 CONTAINMENT OF ISOTOPES IN EXPERIMENTS
EXPERIMENT ELECTRONICS RADIATION HARDENING
SHIELDED STORAGE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM Si EMULSIONS
DOSIMETRY MEASUREMENT IN FILM STORAGE
DOSIMETRY FOR SENSITIVE BIOSCIENCE EXPERIMENTS
USE OF RADIATION SCREENING TECHNIQUES
DETACHED MODULES FOR y 81 n SENSITIVE EXPERIMENTS
SENSITIVE EXPERIMENT LOCATION WITHIN REACTOR SHADOW SHIELDING
SAFETY FEATURES FOR DYNAMIC GENERATOR EQUIPMENT
EXPERIMENT LAB SAFETY FEATURES WITH ISOTOPES/TRACERS
APPLICABLE SYSTEMS
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NUMBER
GD-078
GD-079
GD-OSO
GD-081
GD-082
GD-083
GD-084
GD-085
GD-086
GD-087
GD-088
GD-089
GD-090
GD-091
GD-092
GD-093
GD-094
(OPERATIONS 1
GO-001
GO- 002
GO-003
GO-004
GO-005
GO-006
GO-007
GO-008
GO- 009
CO-010
GO-OU
GO-012
GO-013
GO-014
GO-015
GO-016
GO-017
GO-018
GO-019
GO-020
GO-021
GO-022
GO-023
GO-024
GO-025
GO-026
GO-027
GO-028
GO-029
GO-030
GO-031
GO-032
GO-033
TITLE
ISOTOPE THERMAL SHIELDING
G-LOCATION OF EXPER LABS USING ISOTOPES/TRACERS
ISOLATABLE/REMOVABLE EXPERIMENT LABS
LOCATION OF EXPER LABS USING DYNAMIC GENERATORS
SHIELDING FOR DOCKED/DETACHED EXPERIMENT MODULES
SHUTTLE/TUG GAMMA SHIELDING
IR SCANNER THERMAL RADIATION INTERFERENCE
USE OF UNIVERSAL TRANSPORTER
HARDWARE POSITIONING AND TIE DOWNS
DECONTAMINATION CAPABILITY
FACILITY DESIGN
FACILITY MODIFICATIONS
LIQUID METAL SERVICING & SAFING
LIQUID METAL SERVICING FACILITY LOCATION
LIQUID MET AL/NUC LEAR HDWE FIRE PROTECTION
LIQUID METAL SUMPS
SEGREGATED NUCLEAR HARDWARE STORAGE
USE OF NUCLEAR EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL
MINIMIZE NUCLEAR HDWE OPERATIONS AT LAUNCH PAD
AIR TRANSPORTATION OF REACTOR PM
BARGE TRANSPORTATION Of REACTOR PM
TRANSPORTATION ESCORTS Si WARNINGS
TRANSPORTATION ROUTE SELECTION
ORDNANCE/ROCKET-FACILITY RESTRICTIONS
MINIMUM HANDLING OF REACTOR PM
LAUNCH VEHICLE INTERFACE SIMULATION
REACTOR CRITICALITY TEST
PRELAUNCH TESTING OF REACTOR PM
RESTRICTION OF CONTROL DRUM MOVEMENT
PRELAUNCH REACTOR PM SIMULATION
PM INSTALLATION LATE IN PRELAUNCH SEQUENCE I
PERIODIC CHECKOUT I
READINESS STATE OF STORAGE REACTOR Si ISOTOPES
DUMMY PM ORBITAL HANDLING OPERATIONS
LOW LEVEL OPERATION DURING REACTOR REPLACEMENT
EMERGENCY REACTOR PM OPERATION
NO REPAIR OF LIQUID METAL LINES
REPAIR RESTRICTIONS IN REACTOR GALLERY AREA
REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT OF PM AFTER REACTOR SHUTDOWN
SLOW DRUM MOVEMENT FOR RESTART
AVOIDANCE OF SUBSTANCES THAT REACT WITH LIQUID METALS
IGNITABLE MATERIAL HAZARDS AROUND HEAT SOURCES
INTEGRATION OF ISOTOPES WITH SPACE BASF
CREW ROTATION PROCEDURES
EVA RESTRICTIONS THROUGH SOUTH ATLANTIC ANOMALY
EVA RESTRICTIONS DUE TO REACTOR RADIATION
EVA RESTRICTIONS DUE TO PM THERMAL RADIATION
EVA COORDINATION WITH RSO
EVA RESTRICTIONS WITH NaK LEAKS
MPLEMENTATION OF APPROACH & LOITER OPERATIONS
APPLICABLE SYSTEMS
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GO-034
GO-03S
GO-036
GO-037
GO-038
GO-039
GO-040
GO-041
GO-042
GO-043
GO-044
GO-045
GO-046
GO-047
GO-048
GO-049
GO-050
GO— 051
GO-052
GO-053
GO-054
GO-055
GO-056
GO-057
GO-058
GO-059
GO-060
GO-061
GO-062
GO-063
GO-064
GO-065
GO-066
GO-067
TITLE
MAINTENANCE OF NOMINAL BRAKING GATE VELOCITIES
LOITER TIME CONSTRAINTS
PROMPT CREW RESCUE
CREW RESCUE OPERATIONS
RNS APPROACH CONSIDERATIONS
APPROACH CORRIDORS WITH INTERFACING VEHICLES
EXPERIMENT MODULE DEPLOYMENT TRAJECTORY
EXPERIMENT SCREENING PROCEDURES
CURTAILMENT OF EXPERIMENT OPERATION
PLANNED EXPERIMENT INTERFERENCE
OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS-DYNAMIC RAD
LASER BEAM OPERATION RESTRICTIONS
PHOTO FILM/EMULSION RESUPPLY
GEN
HIGH SPEED FILM RESUPPLY AFTER INTENSE SOLAR FLARE
MCC SUPPORT DURING MISSION
LOITER Si TRANSFER OPER RESTRICTIONS
ADVANCED WARNING OF NUCLEAR IMPACT
TRACKING NETWORK ADDITIONS
SAFING S-1I OBSTRUCT SYSTEM
COMMAND OBSTRUCT DELAY
FLIGHT DETERMINATION IMPACT AREAS
LAUNCH AZIMUTH RESTRICTIONS '
WEATHER RESTRICTIONS FOR LAUNCH
NUCLEAR PROCEDURES AT LAUNCH SITE
TRAINED FIRE FIGHTING PERSONNEL
MULTIPLE ESCAPE ROUTES
USE OF PROPER CLOTHING Si PROTECTION EQUIPMENT
SMOKING Si EATING REGULATIONS
USE OF TWO MAN "BUDDY" SYSTEM
GROUND SUPPORT RADIATION DOSIMETRY PROCEDURES
CHECKOUT AND INTEGRATION IN VAB
STORAGE AREA IN NUCLEAR ASSEMBLY BUILDING
STORAGE LIFETIMES
APPLICABLE SYSTEMS
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SECTION 5
SAFETY GUIDELINES
SECTION 5
SAFETY GUIDELINES
This section contains the complete set of guidelines and requirements arranged in the follow-
ing order:
Requirements
Design Requirements RD-001 - RD-011
Operations Requirements RO-001 - RO-007
Guidelines
Design Guidelines GD-001 - GD-094
Operations Guidelines GO-001 - GO-067
5-1/2
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-001
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Packaging, Transportation,
Storage and Handling;
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch
TITLE: REACTOR POWER MODULE SHIPPING AND STORAGE CONTAINER
STATEMENT Provide shipping and storage containers and procedures in conformance
with AEC manual Chapter 0529 and the Department of Transportation regulations in
Volume 33, No. 194 of the Federal Register.
JUSTIFICATION Shipping and storage containers used for nuclear hardware must be
designed to and in conformance with above regulations to allow shipping and storage
within the USA.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.3
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-002
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor Control
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: REACTOR CONTROL DRUM LOCKOUT DEVICES
STATEMENT Provide a. positive means for locking reactor control drums in the least
reactive position during all prelaunch operations and at the end of mission disposal
phase
JUSTIFICATION Provides protection against ground transportation, checkout, launch pad
installation, inadvertant signal and disposal critacality accidents.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Lockout devices which can be singularly or multiply released by command
should be considered. Reinitiating these devices after powerplant usefulness in orbit
is also advisable.
Remote operation should be considered.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2. 1, 5.2.3, 5.2.5, 6.3.2,
72SD4201-3-2 7. . , 7. .
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-035
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-003
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Ground Support,
Range Safety
OPERATION
Reactor Safing
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission/Recovery
TITLE: SAFING REACTOR IN QUASHSTEADY STATE CONDITION
STATEMENT Provide means of safing an aborted or impacted reactor undergoing
quasi-steady state operation.
JUSTIFICATION Reduce dispersal of radioactive materials, radiation levels and contam-
ination and provide accessibility to reactor for recovery.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Quasi-steady state conditions can result when emmersed in shallow water
areas. Safing methods need to be evaluated.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5, 5.3.2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-004
GD-035
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-004
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Interfacing
Vehicle-Shuttle
OPERATION
Disposal
MISSION PHASE
Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: SAFE DISPOSAL RECOVERY OF REACTOR/SHIELD
STATEMENT Provide an effective reactor/shield disposal or recovery system capable
of enacting disposal at anytime after orbit has been achieved. Safe disposal is assumed
to mean the planned discarding or recovery of the reactor, providing for minimum
radiological risk to the general public.
JUSTIFICATION The most hazardous reactor conditions exist for several years after power-
plant operations (fission product inventories are high). Random reentry cannot be toler-
ated during this time period.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Disposal can be achieved by a boost of the reactor/shield or entire power module
into a high earth orbit providing a several hundred year decay time. Eventual reentry,
even though of low radiological risk may be politically undesirable. Reboost may be
necessary. The shuttle provides a prime alternative whereby safe recovery can be
virtually assured.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 5, 7. 3.4
72SD4201-3-2
72SD4201-3-3 Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-005
RD-006
GD-011
GD-029
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-005
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reentry and Impact
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: REACTOR REENTRY AND IMPACT PROTECTION
STATEMENT Provide an effective reliable reentry and impact protection shield for a
reactor capable of reentry and impact survival prior and after long term operation
in space.
JUSTIFICATION Reentry burnup of a reactor powerplant is of low risk to the general
populance, but spreads low level radiation over a large portion of the world. Political
implications are undesirable even though radiological risk may be low. Prevention of
reactor disassembly upon earth impact can minimize the dispersal of fission products
and inhalables which reduce the subsequent radiological hazards.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS LiH is currently used as an effective neutron shield and is also contemplated
for use as the reentry heat shield. Tests, although inconclusive, indicate that LiH
may not be an entirely effective ablative shield due to the dissociation of H2« Further
study is necessary and the incorporation of additional heat shield material combined with
impact protection should be considered. Tests should account for long term deterioration
due to radiation, space vacuum, temperature, etc.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7.2.2, 7.3.4
72SD4201-3-2
72SD4201-3-3
CROSS REFERENCESRD-004
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-006
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Isotopes, later
facing Vehicles - Shuttle
OPERATION
Disposal
MISSION PHASE
End of Mission/Disposal
TITLE: REDUNDANT OR ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPOSAL
STATEMENT Capability shall be provided for a redundant or an alternative means of
disposal or recovery of the Reactor/Shield or Isotope.
JUSTIFICATION Early reentry of a post operational reactor must not be permitted, as
source terms can be high with corresponding relatively high risks to the general
populace.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Consider replaceable disposal module components, a replaceable disposal
module and or the use of the Space Shuttle as a means of recovery
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 7. 3. 4
72SD4201-3-2
72SD4201-3-3
72SD4201-4-1
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-004
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
KD-007
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Isotopes
OPERATION
Packaging, Transportation,
Storage and Handling
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE SHIPPING AND STORAGE CONTAINER DESIGN
STATEMENT Provide isotope shipping and storage containers and procedures in conformanct
with AEC Manual, Chapter 0529 and the Department of Transportation regulations in
Volume 33 No. 194 of the Federal Register.
JUSTIFICATION Shipping and storage containers used with nuclear material must be
designed to and in conformance with the above regulations to allow authorized shipping and
storage within the U.S.A. and to minimize hazard potential.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Design must include prevention of critical masses, provide for adequate
cooling and freedom from penetration.
Refer to SNAP-27, SNAP-19 and IRV shipping container designs and philosophy.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Sections 5.2.1, 5. 2. 3
SC-M-7 0-434 Isotope Brayton Safety
Feasibility Study
CROSS REFERENCES
RO-003
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-008
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Isotopes
OPERATION
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch Ascent, Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: HEAT SOURCE FUEL CAPSULE CONTAINMENT
STATEMENT Provide heat source encapsulation to prevent fuel release under all credible
subjected environments
JUSTIFICATION Prevention of fuel release will significantly reduce the source terms and
potential hazards to personnel by ingestion and inhalation.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.1, 5.2.3, 6.3
72SD4201-4-1
72SD4201-4-2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-068
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-009
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Isotopes
OPERATION
Launch
MISSION PHASE /4vENT
Prelaunch, Launch Ascent
TITLE: FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION
STATEMENT Provide fragmentation protection for isotope fuel capsules in shipping
container design and in the launch configuration to reduce fuel capsule rupture potential
from penetration, and explosive accidents
JUSTIFICATION Fragmentation protection will reduce the source terms associated
with the release of fuel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Fragmentation protection can be placed around the fuel capsule or in
special cases, placed near the penetrating or explosive source.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.5,
5.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-022
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-010
PROGRAM ELEMENT I SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Space Base Isotopes, Ground Support
OPERATION
Ground Operations
MISSION PHASE/
Prelaunch, Launch Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE COOLING
STATEMENT Provide redundant external cooling for isotope heat sources during non-
operational periods to lower and maintain capsule temperatures at or below 420°K
in the natural open air environment.
JUSTIFICATION Isotope fuel capsule cooling to 420 K is required to prevent fuel clad
oxidation and eventual rupture in an open air environment and to reduce the ignition
potential. Fuel clad weakening and ruptures will increase the radiological source terms
and associated hazard to personnel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Cooling to prevent capsule damage is most important where refractory
metal encapsulation is used.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.1, 5.2.3, 5.2.5 CROSS REFERENCES
GO-025
GD-044
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-011
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Ground Support, Facilities
OPERATION
Ground Operations
MISSION PHASE/
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission/Recovery
TITLE: PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY AND RADIATION MONITORING (GROUND)
STATEMENT Personnel dosimetry and or portable and fixed radiation monitoring/alarm
provisions must be available and used in all areas designated "Radiation Areas" in
accordance with 10CFR-20 (yearly radiation levels which may exceed 0.5 rem per year).
JUSTIFICATION To monitor and control radiation doses received by personnel. To avoid
over exposures and to take necessary remedial actions should radiation doses reach
undesirable levels.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Equipment includes portable, pocket type and fixed dosimetry and
alarms in addition to biological specimens (urinanalysis).
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.6, 5. 3.3 CROSS REFERENCES GD-051
GD-052
GD-053
GD-059
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-001
PROGRAM EL.EMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
General
OPERATION
Ground Support, Orbital
Activities
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
All Phases
TITLE: STRICT ADHERENCE TO PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS
STATEMENT Provide and enforce training, instruction, drills, signs and written procedures
for work in and around nuclear and liquid metal facilities and hardware.
JUSTIFICATION The importance of this type of enforcement cannot be over stressed in the
nuclear industry due to the nature of the unseen, unheard and unfelt radiation. Abiding by
regulations and rules must be inborn.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5, 5.2.6
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-002
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
General, Facilities
OPERATION
Ground Activities
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
P relaunch
TITLE: PERSONNEL LIMITATIONS AND REGULATIONS
STATEMENT Limit and regulate personnel in nuclear hardware designated areas.
JUSTIFICATION Prevent untrained and unauthorized personnel errors involving nuclear
hardware and minimize and record radiation dose to personnel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-003
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMReactor PM, Isotope,
Facilities
OPERATIONAssembly, Transportation and
Storage
MISSION PHASE /^VENT
P relaunch
TITLE: NUCLEAR HARDWARE STORAGE AND PACKING LIMITS
STATEMENT Adhere to nuclear hardware storage and packing limits to prevent critical
assemblies.
JUSTIFICATION Storage and packing limits must be determined and adhered to to prevent
critical masses and subsequent severe nuclear radiation hazards.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Anti-criticality containment should be specified and designed into storage and
shipping containers.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.4
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-007
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-004
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor Disposal
MISSION PHASE^VENT
End of Mission/Disposal
TITLE: REACTOR DISPOSAL RECOVERY
STATEMENT Provision should be made for a high earth orbit boost of the reactor power
module or reactor/shield which permits a decay lifetime of > 100 years. A prime
alternative to this guideline is the use of the proposed shuttle as a means of recovery to
the earth.
JUSTIFICATION The principle nuclear risks to the general populace are during the End of
Mission/disposal phase due to the potential large fission product inventory of the reactor
core. A highly reliable boost to an orbit of a minimum of 100 years decay time will allow
fission products to decay to nearly negligible levels.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Reliability of disposal boost package is key element. Eventual re-entry o:'
reactor/shield may not result in a radiological safely hazard, but may be undesirable
politically. Retrieval or reboost should be considered.
The availability of an earth-space shuttle provides a reliable and minimum risk mode of
reactor disposal/recovery.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2 Section 7.2.2, 7.3.4, Appendix!
72SD4201-3-2
72SD4201-3-3
72SD4201-4-1 72SD4201-4-2
CROSS REFERENCES
Go-051
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-005
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments, Isotopes
OPERATION
Isotope Recovery
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: RETURN TO EARTH OF EXPERIMENT ISOTOPES
STATEMENT Provide for tiie intact return to earth of isotopes and contaminated waste
associated with the experiment program.
JUSTIFICATION Radiation contamination of the upper atmosphere snould be avoided and
random reentry of isotope capsules should not be planned to prevent accidental exposure
of the general populace.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Retreival and reentry/recovery by the Space Shuttle should be considered
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3. 1.4, 1.3.2
72SD4201-4-1 Section 5
72SD4201-4-2 Section 3
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-051
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-006
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Range Safety, Ground Support,
Reactor PM. Isotopes
OPERATION
Contingency, Recovery
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch, Launch/As cent, End of Mission/Recovery
TITLE: USE OF IMPACT/RECOVERY TEAM
STATEMENT Provide emergency equipment and trained personnel who can quickly render
safe and supervise the recovery and handling of impacted and or damaged nuclear hardware
at all potential locations around the world.
JUSTIFICATION Reduce contamination and radiation hazards to the ecology and general
populace.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Launch/Ascent and End of Mission phases may require the team to provide
render safe and recovery support at any location along the payload trajectory.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-001
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-007
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Facilities, Reactor PM,
Isotopes
OPERATION
Prelaunch Operations and Launch
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent
TITLE: ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED AREAS
STATEMENT Provide controlled areas for the prelaunch operations and an exclusion area
for launch operations. Current 13 Km administratively controlled area appears adequate
for perimeter control around nuclear operations. An exclusion area of ^  4 Km should be
established around the launch pad at launch.
JUSTIFICATION To reduce radiation hazard potential to the general populace around the
launch site and hazards to ground support personnel at launch.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Specified areas at KSC appear adequate
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.6, 5.3.2
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-001
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
General
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch Ascent, Orbital Operations
TITLE; RADIATOR COOLANT FLUID SELECTION
STATEMENT where performance permits, consideration should be given to the use of
non-liquid metal radiators to substantially reduce the liquid metal hazards.
JUSTIFICATION Some powerplant cycles, namely the Brayton cycle and organic rankine
cycle afford the possibility of a non-liquid metal radiator. Handling, fire protection
and facility requirements are simplified. Use of non-liquid metal loops minimizes the
associated liquid metal hazards.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Non-liquid metal radiators provide reduced liquid metal inventory and hazards,
but due to their lower operating temperature are larger in overall area. Other perfor-
mance tradeoffs need to be considered
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.2.5, 5.2.6, 7.2.4
72SD4201-3-2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-020
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-002
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Ground Support,
Facilities
OPERATION
Prelaunch Operations
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent
TITLE; REACTOR POWER MODULE LIQUID METAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
STATEMENT Provide protection/isolation of the liquid metal components and radiators
from the ambient air, O2, water and other hydrogenous substances during prelaunch
and launch ascent operations.
JUSTIFICATION Liquid metals such as NaK, react with Oo and hydrogenous substances.
Reactions can result in fires and possibly explosions which can be the cause of severe
equipment damage and secondary fires.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Double wall containment can be provided to prevent leaks to the air in many
situations. Some components cannot be efficiently designed with double wall containment
and the best single protection may be the use of an environmental cover gas (blanket)
such as Argon, Helium or Nitrogen. Such a blanket can be in place throughout most of
the prelaunch and launch operations.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.2.5
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-002
GD-003
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-003
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Ground Support
OPERATION
Launch Site Operations
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch
TITLE: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT LAUNCH SITE (REACTOR PM>
STATEMENT Consider provision of an environmental protective shroud (vapor barrier)
around power module while at launch site.
JUSTIFICATION Provides an added measure of protection in the humid and salt
laden air at KSC. Reduces possibility of liquid metal reactions.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Barrier could be included in thermal shroud and designed to assist purging
operations.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2. 5
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-002
GD-006
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-004
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
General
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelauuch, Launch Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: REACTOR DESIGN TO PRECLUDE CRITICALITY ACCIDENTS
STATEMENT Provide a. reactor design which is relatively free from criticality accidents
(power excursions) resulting from collisions, pad explosions or impact on the earth's
surface or water.
JUSTIFICATION The risk to the general populace during the prelaunch and launch ascent
phases of the mission can practically be eliminated if excursions can be prevented. A
reactor excursion is a major source of radiation and this potential risk to the general
populace needs to be avoided.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS The reference ZrH reactor is relatively insensitive to criticality accidents.
It is relatively free from compaction accidents which can bring about an excursion.
Areas of concern include possible control drum rotation, overmoderation due to water
or hydrogen immersion, etc.
The use of an alternative reactor (e. g.; fast reactor) may require additional study and
design effort to reduce this hazard
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.3, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.5
72SD4201-2-1A
72SD4201-3-3
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-003
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-005
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor Control and Start-up
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Orbital Operations
TITLE: REACTOR CONTROL DRUM POSITION INDICATORS
STATEMENT Provide an independent means of sensing individual reactor control drum
position.
JUSTIFICATION Control drum position indication will assist in the control drum/actuator
rotation checks conducted in ground checkout and will provide positive control position
during startup and reactor operations in orbit.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Present ZrH reactor utilizes a pulse counting system which is not a positive
means of determining control drum position should a drive train failure or a sticking
drum occur. Detents to indicate rotation past designated points could be considered.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.5, 7.2.2
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-011
GO-012
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-006
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Leak Containment
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch Ascent, Orbital Operations
TITLE: NaK LEAK CONTAINMENT
STATEMENT Provide a. means to minimize or contain a NaK leak within a reactor
power module.
JUSTIFICATION Reduce potential hazards, radioactive NaK contamination and fire
potential.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Double containment and isolation values should be considered. Use of an
additional barrier such as an inert cover gas during prelaunch activities should also be
considered.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.2, 5.2.5, 5.2.6, 6.2.2, 7.2.1,
7.2.2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-003
GD-007
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-007
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Leak Detection
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch, Launch Ascent, Orbital Operations
TITLE: NaK COOLANT LEAK DETECTION
STATEMENT Provide means of measuring/detecting NaK leaks within the coolant loops.
JUSTIFICATION Minimizes the NaK release hazards and will provide early determination
of leaks, possible affected areas and implementation of emergency procedures. An
early detection and subsequent safing on the launch pad may prevent major equipment
damage due to fire and explosions. Detection during ascent would preclude docking of
a damaged powerplant.
HAZARD
CATEGORV
REMARKS Consider use of pressure and flow measurements in the coolant loops. When
combined with Guideline GD-006, provides a means of detection, isolation and switchover
to redundant loop.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.2, 5.2.5, 6.2.2, 7.2.1
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-003
GD-006
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-008
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor Separation from PM
MISSION PHASE/^VENT
Prelaunch, Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: REACTOR PRIMARY LOOP AND INTERMEDIATE LOOP SEPARATION
STATEMENT provide a. means of separating the reactor/shield from the intermediate
coolant loop and primary radiator.
JUSTIFICATION Provides a clean separation interface which (1) allows separate shipment
of the reactor/shield apart from the rest of the power module, (2) permits reactor/shield
or primary radiator replacement in orbit and (3) permits disposal or recovery of just the
reactor/shield. These features minimize the transportation, handling, and disposal
hazards. The boost to high earth orbit of the reactor/shield only, will increase the objects
ballistic coefficient to achieve orbital decay lifetimes 9 to 10 times greater than achievable
with a complete power module.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Consider the use of a separable heat exchanger concept.
REFERENCES 72SD4201 -2-1 Section 5. 2. 3, 7.2.2, 7.3.4 CROSS REFERENCES
RD-004
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-009
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Disposal Module Rocket and
Component Installation
MISStON PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission
TITLE: REACTOR DISPOSAL ROCKETS AND COMPONENTS DESIGNED FOR
STATEMENT SEPARATE INSTALLATION
Capability shall be provided for the installation of rocket motors at the launch pad and
the replacement of life limited "black box" components in-orbit prior to enacting
disposal.
JUSTIFICATION Rocket motor installation at the launch pad reduces the hazards within the
nuclear assembly facilities and in the Vehicle Assembly Building. In-orbit replacement
of black boxes permits repair of a faulty disposal module so disposal can be enacted.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Consider possibility of engine room type replacement in-orbit to allow
IVA and possible shirtsleeve environment.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2. 3, 5.2.5
72SD4201-3-2
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-007
GD-029
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-010
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor Shutdown - Restart
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Launch Ascent/ Orbital Operations
TITLE: PREVENTION OF NaK COOLANT LOOP FREEZE-UP
STATEMENT Assure against NaK coolant freeze-up within the coolant loops of the power
module.
JUSTIFICATION NaK-78 freezes at ~ 260°K (12°F) and would be subject to freezing during
launch ascent and in orbit when the reactor is not m operation. Severe freezing can cause
coolant loop damage. Frozen loops also become difficult to thaw in order to permit
circulation and cooling of the reactor. Overtemperature conditions or complete failure
to operate can result.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Freeze conditions can exist at launch, ascent and in orbit. Freeze-up can
also occur after a reactor shutdown and prior to restart. Consideration should be given
to a radiator shroud which can be removed or repositioned on command and or electrical
or nuclear heaters in the loops coupled with circulation. A barbeque mode could also be
used to some advantage.
REFERENCE S 72SD4201-2-1 Section 7. 2. 2 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-001
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-011
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Range Safety
OPERATION
Tracking
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Launch, Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: REACTOR TRACKING AND IMPACT LOCATION DEVICES
STATEMENT Provide reactor/tracking and impact location devices which can assist in
orbit and reentry tracking and location of impact zones on the earth or in shallow water
areas.
JUSTIFICATION Principle risks to the general populace occur during the end of mission
phase upon reentry and impact of the reactor on the earths surface (Shuttle recovery will
minimize the hazards). Tracking and eventual location of the reactor will provide added
warnings and quick isolation of hazards should reentry and impact occur either on launch/
ascent or during the end of mission.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Effective for reservoir, lake or land impact. Transponders, pingers,
dye markers etc. can be considered. Reliability over the hundreds of years lifetime
in a wide range of temperatures and servere radiation environment must be an
important design goal.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 3.2, 5.4, 7.3.4
72SD4201-3-3
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-004
GO-050
GO-051
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-012
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Decay Heat Removal
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: INDEPENDENT REACTOR/SHIELD DECAY HEAT REMOVAL
STATEMENT Pr-ovide an independent reactor/shield decay heat removal system capable
of the dissipation of reactor heat in the event of loss of coolant during operation.
JUSTIFICATION Prevents reactor meltdown and subsequent release of fission products
and activated materials. Reduces nuclear hazards in orbit.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS The reference ZrH power plant has marginal self cooling capability at its
normal 330 kWt operating power level. Higher power levels would require the Tieat
removal system. Similar consideration should be given to alternative powerplant
designs. Multiple operating PCS can also reduce the possibility of these situations.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 2. 2, 6.3.2, 7.2.2,
7.3.4
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-034
GO-019
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-013
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Ground Support
(Mission Control)
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
MCC, Reactor PM
OPERATION
Operations and Disposal
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations and End of Mission
TITLE: GROUND CONTROL BACKUP OF REACTOR POWER MODULE OPERATIONS
STATEMENT Provide real-time back-up and alternate control and monitoring of reactor
power module operations via the Mission Control Center.
JUSTIFICATION Provides contingency and backup capability. Permits the additional
ground support required in obtaining and evaluating reactor power module operating
histories and fault diagnosis. Assists in mission planning and logistic resupply.
Permits disposal control functions to be administered by the MCC if necessary.
•-
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Requires long term attended support by Mission Control Center personnel.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Sections 5.2, 5.3.4, 5.4.2, 7.2.2, 7.3.4
72SD4201-3-3
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-048
GD-027
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-014
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Power Module Operation
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations End of Mission
TITLE: PRIMARY LOOP NaK COMPONENT LOCATION
STATEMENT Primary loop NaK components (e. g., accumulator, pumps, heat exchanger)
should be located within a gallery which provides shielding of the crew from the activated
NaK. This shielding is particularly important during maintenance operations within the
power module engine room.
JUSTIFICATION Radiation doses from unshielded NaK can be a significant contributor when
full 4ir reactor shields are used.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Galleries can be placed between the reactor and the shield or as in the case
of the reference Space Base power module - placed on the outside of the reactor shield
but away from the Space Base and crew quarters.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-lSection7.2.2, 7.3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-021
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-015
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM PLACEMENT
STATEMENT The Power Conversion System components including rotating equipment
should be placed toward the aft of the Power Module to permit ease of maintenance
and lower radiation doses to the crew. Placement of the TAC unit in the aft section
away from the reactor shield will also reduce shield fragmentation potential caused by
TAC failures.
JUSTIFICATION Radiation levels drop significantly as you move away from the reactor/
shield within the power module ~a factor of 10 in 5 meters.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Placement of the components within an engine room at the aft end of the Power
Module (~ 8. 5 meters from the reactor) can lower radiation levels to less than 40 mrem/
hr thereby permitting repair stay times of several hours. A pressurized compartment
can also be considered.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-lSection7.2.6, 7.3.3
SD-60-168-2 Volume H
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-017
GD-025
GD-033
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-016
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Operation
MISSION PHASE/
Orbital Operations
TITLE: MULTIPLE POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM OPERATION
STATEMENT Consider the provision of simultaneous operation of two power conversion
systems with each operating reactor.
JUSTIFICATION Provides a means of maintaining power in the event of failure of one unit
and also provides for the dissipation of reactor heat while an additional unit comes on
line. Minimizes temperature transients of the reactor and potential temperature excur-
sions due to abrupt loss of cooling accidents.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Normal load can be split between two power conversion systems with each
unit capable of operating at twice its normal power.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-lSection7.2.2, 7.2.6
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-020
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-017
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: PRESSURIZED AND TEMPERATURE CONTROLLED ENGINE ROOM
STATEMENT Provide a. pressurizablc and temperature controlled engine room witiiin
the reactor power module which is accessible without the need of EVA from the Space
Vehicle.
JUSTIFICATION Facilitates repairs of the reactor power conversion system and electrical
distribution system hardware and minimizes crew radiation exposure during maintenance
duties. Allows for shirtsleeve maintenance.
HAZARD
CATEGORV
REMARKS' Engine room does not require continuous pressurization but should be capable
of being environmentally controlled within a few minutes by command from the space
vehicle.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-lSection7.2.2, 7.3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-025 GD-015
GD-026
GD-Q5Q
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-018
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Maintenance
MISSION PHASE ,4vENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: USE OF MULTIPLE REDUNDANCY IN HIGH RADIATION AREAS
STATEMENT Consider use of multiple redundancy components in high radiation areas
of the power module and where EVA is required.
JUSTIFICATION Reduction or elimination of maintenance time in high radiation areas will
reduce the radiation dose to the crew and extend the life of the PM where maintenance
could not be allowed.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7. 3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-021
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-019
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch and Orbital Operations
TITLE: "BLACK BOX" MAINTENANCE FOR REPARABLE EQUIPMENT
STATEMENT Employ the "black box" modular replacement approach in the design of
equipment within the engine room and other repairable locations of the reactor power
module.
JUSTIFICATION Facilitates repairs, reduces diagnosis required and piece part storage
and minimizes crew radiation exposure by shortening repair time.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Black box maintenance can be applied to the component, subsystem and system
level. It lends itself to ease of repair either in or out of a space suit and can substan-
tially reduce dexterity required and overall stay time in potentially hazardous environ-
ments.
This approach should be considered for other systems in the space vehicle where repair
times must be minimized due to hazardous environments.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7. 3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-022
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-020
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: NON-REPARABLE, REDUNDANT NaK LOOP DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
STATEMENT The philosophy used in the design of the NaK coolant loops should be one of
no repair in orbit, but which provides for long life through redundancy, isolation systems,
increased armor and double containment.
JUSTIFICATION The hazards, corrosiveness and handling complexities of NaK make the
repair of NaK lines in a space environment unfeasible.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS It does not appear advisable nor practical to assume repair by the crew of
the NaK coolant loops of a reactor power module. Replacement is advisable.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-lSection6.2.2, 7.3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-001 GD-016
GO-020
GD-024
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-021
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Isotopes
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: USE OF QUICK DISCONNECTS
STATEMENT provide quick disconnects wherever possible in high radiation and otherhazardous areas.
JUSTIFICATION Reduce maintenance time and hence reduce radiation exposure of the
crew.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7.3.3.
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-014
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-022
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Space Base
SYSTE M- SU BSYSTE M
Reactor PM, Isotopes
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: PROTECTIVE SHIELDING AROUND DYNAMIC MACHINERY
STATEMENT Provide protective shielding around dynamic machinery within the power
module to prevent injury to personnel and damage to other hardware.
JUSTIFICATION PCS is comprised of high speed dynamic machinery which if overspeeds
or otherwise flys apart can cause extensive sharpnel damage to adjacent hardware or injury
to personnel in the area. Shielding can confine the damage.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS The placement of shielding involves a trade-off of distance, size etc. for
maximum effectiveness and minimum weight.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 7. 3. 3 CROSS REFERENCES
RD-009
GD-033
GD-015
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-023
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Isotopes
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE^VENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: HIGH TEMPERATURE AND ELECTRICAL HAZARD GUARDS
STATEMENT Provide guards around high temperature equipment and electrical hazards
within the working areas of the power module.
JUSTIFICATION Coolant lines, heat exchangers and the PCS hardware may operate at
temperatures from 150°K up to 900°K or so. Electrical hazards also are present.
Guards preventing contact will reduce potential damage to clothing and personnel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 7.3.3 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-017
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-024
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Operation, Maintenance
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: METEORITE AND SPACE DEBRB PROTECTION OF NaK LOOP
STATEMENT Provide impact protection of primary NaK coolant lines to minimize
probability of meteorite and space debris damage and subsequent loss of coolant and
release of fission products.
JUSTIFICATION Meteorite and space debris impact probabilities are such that added
protection in exposed areas can reduce the possibility of releasing radioactive NaK
to the space environment surrounding the space vehicle.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Increased armor and/or double wall containment in exposed areas can be
considered. The gallery is exposed in the reference design of the study.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-lSection6.3.2, 7.2.1, 7.2.2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-020
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-025
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: PLACEMENT OF REPARABLE COMPONENTS
STATEMENT Components with repair frequencies less than the lifetime of the power
module should be placed in the engine room.
JUSTIFICATION Maintenance and repair in the engine room will eliminate need for EVA
and reduce radiation dose to the crew
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7.3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-017
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-026
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations, End of Mission/Disposal
TITLE; PLACEMENT OF DISPOSAL SYSTEM ELECTRONICS
STATEMENT Consider placement of disposal system electronics within the engine room
to provide ease of maintenance and increased environmental protection.
JUSTIFICATION Electronics are susceptible to radiation and temperature fluctuation damage
and therefore may exhibit somewhat reduced reliability in long duration missions. Repair
or replacement of these components within the engine room as contrasted from external
portions of the PM will eliminate EVA and reduce radiation exposure to the crew.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 7. 3. 3, 7.3.4 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-017
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-027
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Isotopes,
Ground Support. MCC
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: FAULT DIAGNOSIS BY GROUND SUPPORT
STATEMENT Consider the use of ground support systems to assist in the diagnosis of
power module faults and failure conditions while in orbit.
JUSTIFICATION Quick and accurate fault isolation and repair results in minimum system
down time and reduces the radiation dose received by the crew during repair operations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Fault diagnosis should include a tie in with the data management system to
provide advanced warnings of degrading conditions which allow ground and orbital
preparations for repair. Certain repairs could be made prior to a complete failure and
subsequent hazardous condition.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7.3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-013
GD-028
GO-048
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-028
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM3 Isotopes, Communi-
cations and Data Mgt,Grd Support
OPERATION
Maintenance & Repair
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: FAULT ISOLATION DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM
STATEMENT prOyide fault/failure diagnostic capability of the power module to assist in
rapid maintenance and repair.
JUSTIFICATION Quick fault isolation and repair results in minimum down time of the power
system or portions thereof and reduces the time spent in maintenance and hence reduces the
radiation dose received in relatively high radiation areas.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Fault diagnosis system could be tied in with the control room of the Base so
that maintenance procedures can be planned prior to entrance into the PM engine room.
Ground support can also provide added diagnostic data.
REFERENCES
2SD4201-2-1 Section 7.3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-027
GD-048
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-029
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base I
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Disposal
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Orbital Operations, End of Mission/Disposal
TITLE: MODULAR REPLACEMENT OF DISPOSAL SYSTEM
STATEMENT Consider use of a modular disposal system which is capable of being
separated from and installed to the Power Module in orbit.
JUSTIFICATION End of mission risks can be reduced by successful operation of the disposal
system. Long duration missions in the space and high radiation environments may cause
failures in the disposal system. A replaceable module would provide higher total reliability
and reduce or eliminate EVA maintenance and hence reduce the radiation dose to the crew.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS A disposal module compatible with the Shuttle should be considered.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7.3.4
72SD4201-3-3 Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-004
GD-009
GO-007
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-030
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base I SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMReactor PM, Communications &Data Management OPERATIONNormal PM Operations
MISSION
Orbital Operations
TITLE: DETECTION OF ABNORMAL RADIATION FROM REACTOR SHIELD
STATEMENT
from reactor shield damage.
radiological instrumentation to detect increased radiation resulting
JUSTIFICATION Eariy detection of shield damage will allow the crew and ground logistics
to enact early repair or replacement and reduce the potential radiation hazard to the crew.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS This instrumentation could be combined with pressure transducers in the shield
compartments.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.2, 7.3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-032
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-031
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Shield Leak Detection
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: INSURE REACTOR NEUTRON SHIELD INTEGRITY
STATEMENT provide means to improve and insure reactor neutron shield integrity during
operation.
JUSTIFICATION The H2 of a LiH shield dissociates when exposed to space vacuum. This
situation can result from a puncture of the stainless outer clad by meteorites, space debris
collision and possibly natural causes. A puncture will cause an increase in the radiation
level in the vicinity of the puncture and can ultimately lead to a gradual reduction of the
entire shield effectiveness.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Double containment and compartmentalized sealed sections would minimize the
shielding loss due to puncture or leaks and allow additional time for repair or replacement.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.2.2, 6.3.2, 7.2.1, 7.2.2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-030
GD-032
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-032
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Shield Leak Detection
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: Lm SHIELD PUNCTURE DETECTION
STATEMENT Provide instrumentation to detect Reactor LiH shield puncture.
JUSTIFICATION Early detection of shield puncture will allow the crew and ground logistics
to affect repair or replacement, warn of possible radiation streaming and in general mini-
mize the radiation hazard.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Pressure transducers in shield compartments would complement Radiological
safety instrumentation.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.2, 7.3.1, 7. 3. 3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-030
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-033
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Power Module Operation
MISSION PHASE/4:VENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: REACTOR/SHIELD FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION
STATEMENT prOvide reactor/shield protection against fragmentation accidents in the event
of Power Conversion System (rotating machinery) overspeeds and the like, during orbital
operations.
JUSTIFICATION Fragmentation damage can render shield ineffective for radiation attenuation
and may reduce or eliminate the shield reentry capability. Reentry may result in burnup
and dispersal of radioactive material in atmosphere.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Several design features can reduce or nearly eliminate this potential hazard.
Consider the placement of the turbomachinery the maximum feasible distance away. Also
fragmentation shields can be placed around or near the PCS or near the shield. Certain
NaK lines may also require protection.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7.2.1, 7.2.2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-015
GD-022
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-034
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTE M-SU BSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Shield Cooling
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Orbital Operations and End of Mission
TITLE: REACTOR SHIELD COOLING
STATEMENT Consider provision of a reactor shield cooling system which will provide for
reduced and more evenly distributed shield temperatures during peak operations and
reduce or prevent LiH dissociation and associated loss of neutron shield effectiveness.
JUSTIFICATION Local temperatures in the reference design range up to 900°K. Configura-
tion changes such as additional reentry protection would aggravate the problem. Reactor
shields utilizing lithium hydride should be maintained at sufficiently low temperatures to
minimize hydrogen vapor pressure which results from dissociation. Heating of the shield
results from neutron absorption and reactor core heat losses during normal operation and
reactor after-heat due to power system shutdown.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Several design concepts appear feasible, one such concept involves the use of
variable conductance heat pipes to control the temperature. The system could be designed
to maintain the shield at the desired temperature with the variable conductance feature
maintaining temperatures during periods of increased heat load.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7. 2. 2, 7.3.3, 7.3.4
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-012
GO-019
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-035
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor Shutdown
MISSION PHASE/feVENT
End of Mission/Disposal/Recovery
TITLE: POSITIVE AND PERMANENT REACTOR SHUTDOWN MECHANISM
STATEMENT Provide a. positive and permanent reactor shutdown mechanism which renders
the reactor inoperable and incapable of obtaining criticality or of undergoing a criticality
accident at the end of mission for the power module and prior to enacting disposal or
recovery.
JUSTIFICATION Permanent reactor shutdown will prevent excursion accidents in the rela-
tively high risk end of mission phase.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Control drum lockouts and/or core poisons are possible candidates. Permanent
shutdown mechanisms can be irreversible.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3. 7.2, 7. 3. 4
72SD4201-3-2 Sections, 5
72SD4201-3-3 Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-002
GD-038
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-036
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Structure
OPERATION
Contingency Operations
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: RAPID RESPONSE PM EJECTION
STATEMENT Consider the capability for a rapid ejection of the PM during orbital operations
after PM failures which result in potentially high radiation around the Base.
JUSTIFICATION Conditions (although remote) could occur which result in the deposition of
highly radioactive materials in and around the power module. Ejection would reduce the
radiation levels to the crew.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Reactor excursions or destruction by collisions etc. are severe catastrophic
situations. Radiation levels would be very high and only a quick response (seconds-
minutes) will prevent lethal doses from the crew.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-037
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-037
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Structure
OPERATION
Power Module Separation
MISSION PHASE/VENT
End of Mission/Disposal
TITLE: POSITIVE MECHANICAL SEPARATION OF REACTOR POWER MODULE
STATEMENT Provide a positive mechanical means of separating the reactor power module
from the Space Vehicle or Boom assembly under all potential failure conditions including
a loss of power accident.
JUSTIFICATION Permits a highly reliable means of separation from the Space Vehicle inter-
face without EVA or disposal rocket ignition.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS A separation system capable of imparting an initial velocity of approximately one
meter/second is sufficient.
Provision could be made for separation of the Reactor/Shield from the radiator and/or
the Reactor Power module from the Space Vehicle.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Sections 7. 2.1, 7. 2.2, 7. 3. 4
72SD4201-3-1
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-036
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-038
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor Shutdown
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: POSITIVE REACTOR SHUTDOWN MECHANISM (AFTER LOSS OF ELECTRICAL
POWER)
STATEMENT: Provide a positive means for shutdown of the reactor after a loss of electrical
power.
JUSTIFICATION Reactor could continue to operate and continue to generate thermal power
for some time after loss of power to control system and actuators. A loss of the PCS or
radiators would cause loss of cooling and subsequent rupture of fuel elements and possible
release of fission products.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Reactor control should be connected to a back-up power supply and control
system.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 2. 2, 6.3.2, 7.2.1, 7.2.2
72SD4201-3-2
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-002
GD-039
GD-035
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-039
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor Shutdown
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SHUTDOWN MECHANISM
STATEMENT Provide an effective and automatic means of rapid reactor shutdown in specific
failure mode and emergency situations.
JUSTIFICATION To minimize extent of reactor damage and potential hazards due to massive
failures in the power module or control system (e. g., loss of coolant, collisions, shield
damage, loss of control, etc.).
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Consider the use of a SCRAM mechanism or similar feature. System could be
operable in a loss of power accident and where the power module becomes physically and
or electrically separated from the Space Vehicle.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.2.2, 6.3.2, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.3.4
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-038
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-040
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Shield Optimization
MISSION PHASE/feVENT Orbital Operations
TITLE: REACTOR SHIELD DOSE REQUIREMENTS (OPTIMIZATION)
STATEMENT The major contributor to the power system weight is the reactor shield.
A careful tradeoff review of the mission, the natural radiation environment and allowable
crew and equipment doses will allow the design of a minimum weight shaped shield.
JUSTIFICATION A mission permitting increased radiation levels away from the spacecraft
can reduce outer shielding requirements substantially and not necessarily increased
levels in the habitable quarters of the space vehicle. The natural radiation environment
may well be the most significant contributor to the crew integrated dose.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Reactor shield optimization can contribute to a significant reduction in power-
plant weight. Requirements on radiation levels permitted around and away from the
shield should be carefully formulated.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 3.8. 2.1, 6.2, 7.2.2 CROSS REFERENCESGO-029
GO-033
GO-035
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-041
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Comm & Data
Mgt., MCC
OPERATION
Operations & Disposal
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations and End of Mission
TITLE: REACTOR POWER MODULE TELEMETRY, TRACKING AND CONTROL
Provide capability for real-time primary or back-up telemetry tracking
df the power module from the Space Vehicle or the ground (Mission
Control Center).
STATEMENTand control
JUSTIFICATION provides contingency capability should hardwire functions within the Space
Vehicle be terminated or questioned. Provides ground support in obtaining operating
histories and fault diagnosis. Provides location and tracking data and redundant control
of critical disposal functions.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Requires a very reliable receiver, transmitter and command control system on
the power module which is capable of hardwire or telemetry stimulus. A beacon employed
on the reactor shield would enahnce tracking by ground and space radar. Reliability of
such a device under the thermal, radiation and long life environment needs to be evaluated.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1
72SD4201-3-3
Sections 5.2,5.3.4,5.4.2,7.2 ,7.3.4
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-048
GD-027
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-042
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Isotopes
OPERATION
General
MISSION PHASE /£vENT
All Phases
TITLE: USE OF DEPLETED pu-238
17 18STATEMENT The use of Pu 238 depleted in O and O should be considered when
several kg of the material is to be used in manned missions - to reduce radiation doses
to the crew and the general public.
JUSTIFICATION A large heat source may contain several hundred kg of Pu 238. The use
of depleted fuel will reduce the neutron radiation dose rate from ** 1400 mrem/hr to
less than 300 mrem/hr for a representative heat source.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.1
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-043
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Isotopes
OPERATION
Ground Operations
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch
TITLE! ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE SHIELDING
STATEMENT Consider the use of special semi portable and/or portable shielding around or
near isotope capsules to reduce the integrated radiation dose received by ground personnel
who are working with or in near proximity to the sources.
JUSTIFICATION isotope sources constantly emit radiation. Isotope quantities of the size
used in the IRV can emit over 510 mrem/hr at a distance of 1 meter. Shielding can reduce
the dose to personnel and allow longer work times in the area.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Shielding should be provided for the assembly of the large heat source fuel
capsules.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2.1, 5.1.3, 5.2.5
SC-M-70-434 Isotope Brayton Safety Feasibility Study
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-044
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base ,
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Isotopes, Ground Support
OPERATION
Ground Operations
MISSION PHASE^VENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent
TITLE: ISOTOPE INERT GAS BLANKET
STATEMENT Isotopes employing refractory metal encapsulation require the use of an inert
gas environment when not in vacuum conditions to prevent oxidation of the capsule surface
at elevated temperatures.
JUSTIFICATION Oxidation can weaken containment capsule and subject heat source to poten-
tial release of fuel situations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS This is primarily a requirement for refractory metal encapsulation.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2. 3, 5. 2. 5
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-010
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-045
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Isotopes, Ground Support
OPERATION
Handling
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Preluanch, Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: ISOTOPE HANDLING TOOLS
STATEMENT. Provide long handled tools, which assure positive (no drop or release) con-
tact with the isotope specimen.
JUSTIFICATION Long handled tools reduce the radiation levels and in particular the thermal
hazards of the high temperature isotope sources. Positive contact reduces the possibility
of inadvertent dropping of the sources during ground or in-space (possibly zero g and
free space) handling.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Tools must not mar the surfaces of the capsule, if used in EVA or in IVA zero
gravity conditions..means should be provided to eliminate possibility of release of the tool
and/or capsule into free space.
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2. 3
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-046
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Isotopes, Range Safety
OPERATION
Recovery
MISSION PHASE
Launch/Ascent, End of Mission/Recovery
TITLE: FLOTATION GEAR FOR LARGE ISOTOPES
STATEMENT Consider use of flotation gear in the recovery of large isotopes.
JUSTIFICATION Reduce potential hazards to ecology and recover high worth material.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Flotation device could be equipped with a time limited device that provides sub-
mersion if not recovered within a preselected time.
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 3.2
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-005
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-047
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Subsystems - General
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE/feVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT PIECE PART SELECTION FOR RADIATION
HARDENING
STATEMENT: Select components and component piece parts to minimize degradation due to
radiation exposure over the mission duration.
JUSTIFICATION Solid state electronics and similar hardware is most susceptible to degrada-
tion/damage due to radiation. Careful selection of components/materials can provide ade-
quate radiation hardening - resistance to radiation to withstand the 10 year mission environ
ment.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Guideline pertains to bulk and ionization damage effects and is not necessarily
applicable to dose rate effects causing data degradation.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1.3, Appendix A
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-069
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-048
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMCrew Protection, Comm andData Management, MCC
OPERATION
Collision Warning
MISSION PHASE/4VENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: COLLISION WARNING SYSTEM
STATEMENT Provide means for monitoring and warning of imminent collisions with space
debris and orbiting vehicles.
JUSTIFICATION The probabilities of collision over a 10 year mission are high enough to
merit consideration of a warning system which can alert the crew of impending collision of
trackable objects. Damage to the Base and or PM can occur, some giving rise to radio-
logical hazards.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Warning system could be tied in with ground systems and be combined with a
rapid response orbit adjust system.
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 3
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-028
GD-054
GD-058
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-049
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTE M- SU BSYSTE M
Crew Protection
OPERATION
EVA
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: USE OF NEK COMPATIBLE EVA SUIT
STATEMENT Provide emergency EVA suits which are compatible with NaK.
JUSTIFICATION EVA operations may occur following accidents which have released NaK
around the Base. Compatible suit material will prevent damage to the suit and pos-
sible loss of life.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-032
GD-050
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-050
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection, Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor PM Maintenance
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: CREW SUITS IN PM ENGINE ROOM
STATEMENT Consider the provision of EVA and IVA crew protective clothing (suits) in the
engine room to be used for emergency purposes. (Suits to be compatible with the liquid
metal environment).
JUSTIFICATION Normal maintenance and repair may be done in a pressurized shirtsleeve
environment. However, conditions may arise where a loss of pressure occurs or a liquid
metal leak results in unsafe conditions. Donning protective clothing can reduce or eli-
minate injury and allow continued repair to take place.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Normal maintenance performed in a shirtsleeve environment is desired.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7. 22, 7. 3. 3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-017
GD-049
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-051
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection, Structure
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: STORM SHELTER PROVISIONS
STATEMENT Provide Storm Shelter facilities for refuge from solar flare events (particu-
larly applicable for high inclination orbits > 40°).
JUSTIFICATION por mjssjons which require crew stay times of a year or more, the expected
solar flare dose combined with the other radiation environment will exceed the allowable
dose limits to the eyes. A solar flare at anytime can cause rather high doses which could
limit the stay-time of the crew. The use of a shelter can substantially reduce the peak
doses received and extend crew stay time.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Storm shelter provisions are not required for relatively short duration crew
stay times of less than 90 days provided the frequency and intensity of solar flares re-
mains as predicted. Solar flare provisions are discussed in Section 6.3.1.2 of Volume II.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-011
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-052
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: LOCALIZED PROTECTION FOR THE EYES
STATEMENT Consider the use of localized protection for the eyes in relatively high
radiation areas.
JUSTIFICATION The dose limit to the eyes appears to be the most limiting. Localized pro-
tection of the head and eyes can extend the allowable stay time of a particular crew
member.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS The use of special helmets with extra radiation protection for the eyes should be
considered. These precautions may impose additional constraints on visibility and crew
dexterity and may not be required for the short duration missions.
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-011
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-053
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection, Comm. &
Data Management
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE*. ON-BOARD INDIVIDUAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING
STATEMENT Provide on-board radiological monitoring of the accumulated radiation dose
for each crew member.
JUSTIFICATION Although the natural radiation dose within the Space Base modules is fairly
constant, activities around isotopes, repair within the Power Module and EVA activities
can provide significant variances. Dose guideline limits established should not be ex-
ceeded but maximum effectiveness of the crew is important. Individual monitoring assists
in meeting these objectives.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Several special types of personnel dosemetry are necessary and recommended,
both portable and fixed.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1, 7. 3.1
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-011
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-054
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection, MCC, Comm.
& Data Management
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: CENTRAL ON-BOARD RADIOLOGICAL WARNING SYSTEM
STATEMENT Provide a central on-board warning system for the monitoring and alerting
against radiological hazards.
JUSTIFICATION The normal hazards are designed for and crew rotation schedules are
based on them. However, high intensity solar flares or accidental events can cause a
substantial increase in radiation dose. Advanced warnings can help instigate action to
prevent or minimize the occurrence by use of solar storm shelters, changing of Space
Base orbits etc.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS The central warning system should be supported by ground systems ie, solar
flare warnings, and fault diagnosis of nuclear hardware.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.4.1, 6.3.1, 7. 3.1
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-048
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-055
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
tion, Experiments, Navigation &
Control. Interfacing Vehicles
OPERATION
Orbital Activities, Rendezvous
and Docking
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE*. LASER BEAM PROTECTIVE DEVICES
STATEMENT Consider the use of crew shielding and warning devices (particularily for the
eyes) during laser operations.
JUSTIFICATION concentrated light (energy) from laser beam sources can damage eye
retinas.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Current energy level restructions are set at lOmW/cm . The threshold
level for damage to the retina is 0.1 joules/cm .
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-04 5
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-056
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base I SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM CrCWtion, Experiments, InterfacingVehicles OPERATIONOrbital Activities, Rendezvousand Docking
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: AUXILIARY CREW SHIELDING WITH INTERFACING VEHICLE
STATEMENT Consider the use of supplemental shielding for the crew engaged in servicing
detached experiment modules/interfacing vehicles containing nuclear sources.
JUSTIFICATION Normally unmanned detached vehicles containing nuclear sources may not be
provided with personnel shielding. Additional protective shielding carried by the Tug,
Shuttle or on the Base can be used to minimize the dose to the repair/servicing crew,
especially where extended operations are involved.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-057
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMNavigation and Control,
Interfacing Vehicles
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: SCREENING OF DOSE RATE SENSITIVE NAVIGATION & CONTROL EQUIPMENT
STATEMENT Consider the screening of dose rate sensitive navigation and control equip-
ment to eliminate catastrophic interference from high radiation levels during normal
operations or accident conditions.
JUSTIFICATION Screening/protection during approach and rendezvous operations can prevent
erroneous operation of attitude sensors and possible control and guidance errors or des-
truction of sensitive components.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Design of navigation and control equipment should consider possible effects of
gamma and neutron radiation from reactor sources.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1.3, App A
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-058
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Navigation & Control
OPERATION
Orbit Change
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: RAPID ORBIT ADJUST CAPABILITY
STATEMENT Consider providing sufficient orbit adjust capability to rapidly change the
Space Base altitude.
JUSTIFICATION Some remote accident situations or events result in considerable fission
products, gases and radioactive debris around the space. A rapid change of orbit can
reduce the accumulated dose to subsystems and the crew.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Orbit adjust for worst case situation would require a change of orbit ~10Km
within several minutes of the detection.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 3, 6. 3. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-048
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-059
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMCommunications & Data
Management, MCC
OPERATION
Radiological Safety Operations
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: ON-BOARD SUPPORT OF RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PROGRAM
STATEMENT Provide capability and interfaces with the Communications and Data Mana-
gement system to support the recording, processing and handling of radiation dose data.
JUSTIFICATION This capability is particularly important when large crews are to be
supported. Individual doses will vary during the mission and it is important to record
and process dose data on a periodic basis to assure that overdoses and ineffective use of
the crew does not result.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Communication and data management system can be tied into the ground
network.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1, 7. 3.1
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-053
RD-011
GO-048
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-060
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Environmental Control and
Life Support, Isotopes
OPERATION
Radioactive Waste Disposal
MISSION PHASE/^VENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: SEPARATE WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTE
STATEMENT Provide a separate waste management system(s) for crew and laboratory con-
taminated (radioactive) waste.
JUSTIFICATION Radioactive waste (tracer materials) from the crew and laboratories will be
comprised of low level radiation. The radioactivity would not be eliminated from the sys-
tem but in a. closed cycle waste management system would be reprocessed and find its way
into potable water. Separate systems would eliminate the problem.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-080
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-061
PROGRAM ELEMENT
I Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Environmental Control and
Life Support, Isotopes
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: SEPARATE ATMOSPHERE CONTROL FOR LABS CONTAINING ISOTOPES ANDTRACERS
STATEMENT: Consider the use of separate atmosphere control in laboratories/modules
with high concentrations of isotope in use or in storage.
JUSTIFICATION A release of isotopes/tracers into the atmosphere must be prevented from
low level contamination of the entire Base. An isolatable or entirely separate environ-
mental control system would assist contamination control.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Labs employing isotopes/tracers could be located adjacent to one another and
common atmosphere control systems could be considered in specialized cases.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1, 7.3.1, 7.3.2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-080
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-062
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Environmental Control and
Life Support Isotopes
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: LOCALIZED RADIATION SHIELDING FOR ISOTOPE SOURCES
STATEMENT Provide localized radiation shielding for isotope sources located near habita-
tion quarters or near susceptible subsystems or experiments.
JUSTIFICATION Although the dose rates associated with most or tne candidate isotope sys-
tems are low, the accumulated dose to the crew and critical subsystems must be accounted
for. Localized shielding can effectively reduce the hazard.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS The isotope powered waste management system is typical of the type of isotope
that would be located in or near habitation quarters.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1.3, 7. 3. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-063
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-063
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM OPERATION
Structure, Isotopes, Environ-
mental Control and Life Support Orbital Operations
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: LOCATION OF ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCES
STATEMENT Consider locating isotope heat sources in areas of low traffic which are not
continuously occupied by a specific individual(s).
JUSTIFICATION Even through radiation dose rates associated with an isotope heat source
may be relatively low, consideration must be given to the accumulated dose.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS An isotope powered waste management system is a typical isotope heat source
which would be in or near a habitable area but should be removed from the high traffic or
constant occupation areas in so far as possible.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 3, 7. 3. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-062
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-064
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Structure, Environmental Control
and Life Support
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
Maintenance
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: USE OF STRIPPABLE COATINGS
STATEMENT Consider using strippable thermal control coatings on the vehicle exterior
surfaces for long term maintainability and as a means of NaK or fission product decon-
tamination.
JUSTIFICATION Several failure mooes have identified the possibility of NaK or fission pro-
ducts being deposited on the outer surface of the Base. To avoid possible abandonment of
the Base, a strippable coating could be used to bring radiation levels down to allow
habitation.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS • strippable coatings could also be considered for Interior surfaces vulnerable to
contamination.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1, 7. 2. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-066
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-065
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Structures
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: COMPARTMENT ISOLATION/EJECTION
STATEMENT Consider capability to isolate or eject compartments containing a high con-
centration of isotopes/tracers.
JUSTIFICATION Isolation or ejection of a contaminated compartment will reduce the hazard
to other subsystems and the crew.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS If modules containing significant quantities of isotope were attached modules
which could be jettisoned or returned to earth following use or an accident, the radiation
hazards around the Base could be reduced.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 3, 7.2.2, 7.3.2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-080
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-066
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Structures
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: USE OF NaK COMPATIBLE STRUCTURAL MATERIAL
STATEMENT Consider the use of outer structural materials compatible with NaK.
JUSTIFICATION Several potential accidents can cause a release of NaK and possible deposit
on the Base structure. Corrosion can result if non-compatible materials are used.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 3, 7. 2. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-067
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-067
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Structures
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: COATING OF STRUCTURES FOR NaK COMPATIBILITY
STATEMENT Consider the coating of structural surfaces (pressure hulls, tankage, etc.)
with material compatible with NaK.
JUSTIFICATION Several potential accidents can cause a release of NaK and possible adher-
ence to the Base structure. Corrosion can result if non compatible materials are used.
The uses of special coating could prevent NaK corrosion.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 3, 7. 2. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-066
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-068
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments, Isotopes
OPERATION
Isotope Storage
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, Orbital Operations
TITLE; STORAGE AND CONTAINMENT OF ISOTOPES nsr EXPERIMENTS
STATEMENT Provide secure, anti-spill, and unbreakable containers for the storage and
use of isotopes (tracers, capsules) both in launch and operational configurations in zero
"g" and artificial "g" conditions.
JUSTIFICATION Spilllage or release of isotope material, & tracers can result in low level
contamination of parts of or entire modules.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Double containment and special seals should be considered.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 4, 7. 3. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-008
GD-081
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-069
PROGRAM ELEMENT SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Space Base Experiments
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: EXPERIMENT ELECTRONICS RADIATION HARDENING
STATEMENT Provide piece part selection/hardening of electronics associated with experi-
ment equipments expected to be in long term usuage.
JUSTIFICATION Solid state electronics (exclusive of film and emulsions) are most susceptibL
to degradation due to radiation. Careful selection of components and materials can pro-
vide potential for adequate resistance to radiation for long term - 10 year-missions.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Guideline pertains to bulk damage and ionization effects and is not applicable to
dynamic interference (data degradation) of the experiment.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1.4, Appendix A
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-047
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72 I
NO.
GD-070
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMExperiments, Comm & Data
Mgt.
OPERATIONOrbital Activities Film
Storage
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: SHIELDED STORAGE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM AND EMULSIONS
STATEMENT Provide shielded storage for photographic film and emulsions.
JUSTIFICATION Photo film and emulsions are very sensitive to radiation, the faster the
film speed the more sensitive it becomes. Shielding is required of film prior to its pro-
cessing to prevent fogging and reduction of resolution.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
Shielding of high speed film (> ASA 400) with 20 g/cmz will permit its use from
25 to 50 days without severe fogging effects. However, an intense solar flare can wipe
out the entire film supply. Additional shielding is of little use for the high energy particles
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1.4, Appendix A
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-071
GO-046
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-071
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments
OPERATION
Orbital Activities, Film
Radiation Monitoring
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: DOSIMETRY MEASUREMENT IN FILM STORAGE
STATEMENT Consider placing radiation dosimeters in on-board film storage areas to
allow evaluation of fog condition and film acceptability.
JUSTIFICATION Use of degraded, fogged film could render experiment useless. Use of
dosimetry measurement would provide indication of acceptability and prevent use of
damaged film and emulsions.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Periodic checks of film dosimeters is suggested. Additional dosimetry data in
and around the Base would also provide an extimation of film acceptability provided film
was stored in a representative area.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1.4
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-070
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-072
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments
OPERATION
Experiment Radiation
Monitoring
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: DOSIMETRY FOR SENSITIVE BIOSCIENCE EXPERIMENTS
STATEMENT Provide radiation dosimetry monitors for sensitive bioscience experiment
specimens.
JUSTIFICATION Those specimens particularly sensitive to radiation should be monitored
by dosimetry to ascertain whether observed effects may be due to radiation.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1.4
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-073
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments
OPERATION
Orbital Activities, Radiation
Screening
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: USE OF RADIATION SCREENING TECHNIQUES
STATEMENT Consider the design and use of radiation screening of specific experiments
to reduce dynamic interference when taking measurements within environmental radiation
regimes.
JUSTIFICATION Experiments can experience significant data degradation when taking
measurements in or near the radiation environment regime. Screening techniques can
provide some degree of improvement where the obtaining of data is an absolute require-
ment.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Anti-coincidence techniques can be considered.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1.4, Appendix A
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-041
GO-042
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-074
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Experiments, Structure
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: DETACHED MODULES FOR GAMMA AND NEUTRON SENSITIVE EXPERIMENTS
STATEMENT Consider use of detached modules (subsatellites) for the implementation of
reactor gamma ray and neutron sensitive experiments.
JUSTIFICATION Certain experiments, particularly those associated with the astronomy
discipline - are sensitive to the radiation environment generated by a reactor or isotope
sources. In order to reduce dynamic interference, the experiments should be deployed on
detached modules normally operating several KM from the Base.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Additional gamma ray and neutron shielding to substantially reduce or eliminate
dynamic interference becomes prohibitive.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1.4, Appendix A
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-040
GO-045
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-075
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Experiments
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: SENSITIVE EXPERIMENT LOCATION WITHIN REACTOR SHADOW SHIELDING
STATEMENT Maintain neutron and gamma ray sensitive experiments on the Space Base
within the shadow shielding of the reactors.
JUSTIFICATION Neutron and gamma ray fluxes are drastically reduced by the shadow shield
of the reactor, although feasible shields do not eliminate all of the high energy radiation.
Considerable reduction in dynamic interference can be obtained by placement of sensitive
experiments within the shadow shielding cone.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Typical experiments in the NASA "Blue Book" susceptible to neutron and gamma
ray radiation are the astronomy discipline FPE 5.7 and 5.17.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 4, Appendix A
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-041
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-076
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Experiments
OPERATION
Use of Dynamic Generators
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: SAFETY FEATURES FOR DYNAMIC GENERATOR EQUIPMENT
STATEMENT Provide shielding and operational interlocks and restrict reorientation and
relocation of dynamic generators (X-rays, ion guns, lasers and microwave sources).
JUSTIFICATION Stray and focused radiation can be injurious to crew and experiments.
Safeguards must be implemented to prevent inadvertent exposure.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS • Crew members and experiments can be affected in adjacent compartments.
Interlocks and alarms should be considered when equipment is to be used.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 4
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-044
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-077
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments, Isotopes
OPERATION
Isotope Handlingand Containment
MISSION PHASE/4VENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: EXPERIMENT LAB SAFETY FEATURES WITH ISOTOPES/TRACERS
STATEMENT Establish laboratory protection equipment consistent with the type and quantity
of isotope and tracers likely to be used in a given laboratory.
JUSTIFICATION Spillage of isotopes/tracers can result in wide spread low level radiation
which if unchecked may negate experiments and cause abandonment of the module or labor-
atory. The use of protection equipment can reduce or prevent the hazard.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Typical equipment includes filters, radiation detectors, leak detectors, glove
boxes, airlocks, etc.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 4, 7. 3. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-078
GD-079
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-078
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiment, Isotopes
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Orbital Operation
TITLE: ISOTOPE THERMAL SHIELDING
STATEMENT provide thermal shielding to protect personnel and equipment from high tem-
perature isotope capsules.
JUSTIFICATION . isotope capsules can operate at temperatures of over 900UK and would pre-
sent a thermal hazard to personnel and equipment in the vicinity.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Thermal shields, insulation and warning are required.
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 4, 7. 3. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-077
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-079
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments, Isotopes, Structure
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: GRAVITATIONAL LOCATION OF EXPERIMENT LABS USING ISOTOPES/TRACERS
STATEMENT- Consider location of laboratories using isotope tracers, in zero "g" portions
of the Base in order to preclude contamination (spills) resulting from the loss of artificial
"g" capability.
JUSTIFICATION : From time to time zero "g" operation will exist in normally artificial "g"
sections of the Base. Therefore design for zero "g" is necessary and constant zero "g"
operations could minimize spillage.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Zero "g" operation is recommended for only those experiments which do not
require artificial "g".
REFERENCES-
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 4, 7. 3.2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-077
GD-078
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-080
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments, Isotopes, Structure
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operation
TITLE: ISOLATABLE/REMOVABLE EXPERIMENT LABS
STATEMENT Consider locating laboratories with high tracer and isotope concentrations, in
isolatable, removable modules to preclude general internal contamination of large per-
manent portions of the Base.
JUSTIFICATION Spillage or release of isotopes in experiment labs can result in wide spread
low level radiation possibly rendering portions of the Base uninhabitable. Isolation of a lab
could restrict the extent of contamination.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Use of an airlock, separate environmental control or complete removal of the
module could be considered.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 4, 7. 3. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-065
GD-061
GD-060
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-081
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments - Isotopes,Dynamic Generator
OPERATION
Orbital Activities
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: LOCATION OF EXPERIMENT LABS EMPLOYING DYNAMIC GENERATORS ANDISOTOPES
STATEMENT: Consider locating laboratories containing dynamic generator equipment (X--
rays) or isotopes in low traffic areas to minimize exposure to the crew.
JUSTIFICATION • of dynamic generator equipment requires special shielding or curtail-
ment of accessibility. Even though radiation dose rates associated with an isotope heat
source may be relatively low, consideration must be given to the accumulated dose.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS • Radiation labs could be attached modules not in the normal traffic pattern.
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 4
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-080
GD-063
GD-068
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-082
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base ( SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMExperiments, Isotopes, Structure OPERATIONMaintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE/tVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: SHIELDING FOR DOCKED DETACHED EXPERIMENT MODULES
STATEMENT Consider auxiliary shielding of adjacent/radiation sensitive areas of the Base
when detached experiment modules employing isotopes are docked for servicing.
JUSTIFICATION Docking of detached experiment modules containing nuclear sources will
increase the radiation levels in the vicinity. Consideration must be given to sensitive hard
ware and personnel in adjacent areas to minimize the radiation effects on hardware and
dose rates to personnel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Localized, portable shielding could be provided. These requirements are depen-
dent on the type, location and duration of the nuclear source.
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-077
GD-062
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-083
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Interfacing VehiclesSpace Shuttle/Tug
OPERATION
Reactor PM Maintenance
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Launch/Ascent, Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: SHUTTLE/TUG GAMMA SHIELDING
STATEMENT Consider use of special gamma shielding for the Shuttle or Tug crew if imme-
diate reactor servicing is required after shutdown.
JUSTIFICATION • Radiation level at gallery end of reactor shield is high immediately after
shutdown >200 rem/hr. Special shielding would be required to reduce dose rates to
acceptable levels for at least 10 days after shutdown.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS it has been recommended that at least a 10 day waiting period be planned before
Shuttle retrieval is initiated if no additional shielding within the Shuttle is a ground rule.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-084
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Interfacing Vehicles,Navigation and Control
OPERATION
Rendezvous
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: m SCANNER THERMAL RADIATION INTERFERENCE
STATEMENT Design for susceptibility of IR scanners on interfacing vehicles to false signals
from waste heat PM radiators.
JUSTIFICATION Waste heat PM radiators can be a significant IR source. False signals coulc
result in loss of control, and possible damage to both the interfacing vehicle and the Space
Base.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Design of navigation and control equipment should consider possible IR sources
and their effects on scanners.
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1. 3
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-085
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTE M- 8U B 8YSTE M
Ground Support, Reactor PM
OPERATION
Transportation andGround Handling
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch
TITLE: USE OF UNIVERSAL TRANSPORTER
STATEMENT Consider use of a universal transporter during transportation, inspection,
checkout, assembly, integration and storage of the reactor power module.
JUSTIFICATION • Provides environmental protection and minimizes the handling required of
the power module during prelaunch operations. Accident potential is reduced.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Transporter should be equipped with instrumentation to monitor environmenta,
conditions and provide protection from the entrance of hydrogeneous materials during
transportation and storage operations.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-002
GD-003
GO-00 8
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-086
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Ground Support,Reactor, Isotopes
OPERATION
Transportation
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission/Recovery
TITLE: HARDWARE POSITIONING AND TIE DOWNS
STATEMENT Provide secure tie-downs and proper positioning of nuclear hardware on trans-
portation beds to prevent the compaction of fuel into critical masses and possible separa-
tion from the carrier.
JUSTIFICATION. Reduces accident potential and radiological risks to the general populace.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2. 3
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-087
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
8 Y8TE M- 8U B 8 Y8TE M
Ground Support Facilities,Range Safety
OPERATION
Ground Operations
MISSION PHASE /4vENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: DECONTAMINATION CAPABILITY
STATEMENT . Provide radioactive material decontamination capability in nuclear facilities,
and at potential radiation hazard areas.
JUSTIFICATION- Minimize exposure to the ecology and personnel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Apply presently used decontamination procedures used at nuclear facilities.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-058
GO-064
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-088
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Facilities, Reactor PM,Isotopes
OPERATION
Checkout and Storage
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: FACILITY DESIGN
STATEMENT Provide facilities designed for the safe accommodation and storage of nuclear
hardware and components which contain liquid metal inventories.
JUSTIFICATION Reduce potential accidents, hardware damage and nuclear hazards.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Facilities must not contain water sprinklers. They must have clean smooth floors
and have freedom from trapped water due to flooding etc. Environmental protection is
required.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2. 7
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-066
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-089
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Facilities, Reactor PMIsotopes
OPERATION
Prelaunch Operations
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE! FACILITY MODIFICATIONS
STATEMENT . Provide facility modifications (VAB, ML, Launch Pad) to support nuclear
hardware.
JUSTIFICATION To minimize accidents and provide the radiological control, decontamination
limited access and minimum radiation exposure to personnel during operations involving
the nuclear hardware.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Modifications include (1) addition of environmental cover gas, (2) thermal control,
(3) fire protection, (4) radiation monitors, (5) liquid metal leak detection and (6) accessi-
bility, etc.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2. 5, 5. 2. 7
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-065
GO-003
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-090
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Ground SupportLaunch Center
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Facilities. Reactor PM
OPERATION
Liquid Metal Servicingand Safing
MISSION PHASE/&VENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: LIQUID METAL SERVICING AND SAFING
STATEMENT. Provide at minimum, a liquid metal servicing capability which can unload and
render safe a leaking, ruptured or otherwise damaged power module prior to shipment
back to the point of manufacturer or designated repair facility.
JUSTIFICATION Provides the proper equipment and techniques to safe the system and reduce
the liquid metal hazards during shipment to the repair facility. A complete liquid metal
facility capable of liquid metal charging and purification is not specified but should be a
consideration if extensive nuclear activities or several programs are to be supported.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS • No facility of this nature is currently available at KSC.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2. 2, 5. 2. 7
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-089
GD-091
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-091
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Facilities, Reactor PM
OPERATION
Liquid Metal Servicing
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: LIQUID METAL SERVICING FACILITY LOCATION
STATEMENT Consider locating the liquid metal servicing facility outside the nuclear
assembly building but within the confines of the controlled area.
JUSTIFICATION To avoid potential liquid metal accidents and fires from causing damage to
nuclear hardware and equipment located in the nuclear assembly building. Reduces nuclear
accident potential.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2. 7
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-090
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-092
PROGRAM ELEMENT SVSTEM- SUBSYSTEM OPERATION
Space Base Facilities, Ground Support.,Reactor PM., Isotopes Fire ProtectionGround Handling
MISSION PHASE/4VENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: LIQUID METAL/NUCLEAR HARDWARE FIRE PROTECTION
STATEMENT . Provide fire protection capability compatible with launch vehicle and nuclear
liquid metal hardware and operations at KSC.
JUSTIFICATION Normal fire suppressents utilizing hydrogeneous substances or sources con-
taining G£ can not be used in fighting liquid metal fires. Large amounts of water are pre-
sently used at the launch site for launch vehicle fire prevention. New substances and
techniques must be evoluated and provided when liquid metals are present.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS • A thorough evaluation should be conducted of the adequacy and potential incompa-
tibility of the present provisions and procedures at the VAB, ML and launch site in the
fighting of nuclear and liquid metal fires.
Liquid metal fire protection equipment should be marked yellow.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2. 6
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-059
GD-093
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-093
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUB SYSTEM
Facilities, Reactor PM
OPERATION
Fire Protection
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: LIQUID METAL SUMPS
STATEMENT Consider use of liquid metal sump tanks to remove remaining metal into a
confined area.
JUSTIFICATION Permits accessibility for coverage of flames with fire extinguisher.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2. 6
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-092
GO-059
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-094
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
[Facilities, Reactor PM,Isotopes
OPERATION
Storage, Checkout
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch
TITLE: SEGREGATED NUCLEAR HARDWARE STORAGE
STATEMENT Provide adequate isolation (segregation) for the checkout and storage of
various nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION. Reduce potential nuclear hardware damage. Reduce radiation dose rates to
ground support personnel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS. Separate reactor and isotope checkout and storage areas are recommended if
simultaneous operations exist.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2. 4, 5.2. 7
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-066
RO-033
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-001
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
General, Ground Support
OPERATION
Ground Support
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch, Launch/As cent, End of Mission
TITLE: USE OF NUCLEAR EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL
STATEMENT Provide ground support personnel trained and experienced in the handling
and operations of nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION Personnel trained and experienced in the support operations of radioactive
material are made aware of the unique hazards of radiation, are trained in emergency
operations and therefore can reduce the accident potential and doses received.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD42 01-2-1 Section 5,6
CROSS REFERENCES
RO-006
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-002
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
General, Reactor PM, Isotopes,
Ground Support
OPERATION
Prelaunch Activities
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: MINIMIZE NUCLEAR HARDWARE OPERATIONS AT LAUNCH PAD
STATEMENT Keep nuclear hardware operations at the launch pad to a minimum.
JUSTIFICATION Minimizing the exposure of nuclear hardware to the launch pad environment
will reduce the potential of damage and accidents occurring to the nuclear hardware.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Consideration should be given to the installation of nuclear hardware as late
as practical in the prelaunch sequence.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.5
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-002
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-003
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Transportation
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: Am TRANSPORTATION OF REACTOR PM
STATEMENT Consider use of air transportation of reactor PM with special consideration
to the separation of the reactor/shield from the main radiator to permit easier handling
and better air transportation compatibility.
JUSTIFICATION Air transportation (guppy) provides good environmental protection and
speediest delivery. Air routes can be selected to give minimum population overfly.
Separation of radiator from Reactor/Shield can reduce handling problems and reduce the
potential liquid metal hazards in the presence of the reactor.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS A separable heat exchanger permits the separation of the Reactor/Shield from
the main radiator. If air transportation is not possible, barge must be considered when
module diameters of 20+ feet are encountered. Consider use of the transportation trailer.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2. 3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-008
GD-085
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-004
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Transportation
MISSION PHASE
TITLE: BARGE TRANSPORTATION OF REACTOR PM
STATEMENT Where barge transportation is required, the PM must be protected from
the environment and sealed in a water tight and buoyant container equipped with purge gas,
status monitoring equipment and fire protection.
JUSTIFICATION The external environment of barge transportation requires extensive
protective measures to safely transport the reactor and liquid metal inventory.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Use of transportation trailer should be considered.
be incorporated. Emmersion in water should be prevented.
Lockout provisions should
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.3
CROSS REFERENCES
RD-002%
GD-085
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-005
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Isotope,
frround Support
OPERATION
Transportation
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission/Recovery
TITLE: TRANSPORTATION ESCORTS AND WARNINGS
STATEMENT Provide escorts and warnings during transportation of nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION Reduces accident potential and radiological risks to the general populace.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.3
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO006
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Isotope,
Ground Support
OPERATION
Transportation
MISSION PHASE ,4VENT Prelaunch, End of Mission/Recovery
TITLE: TRANSPORTATION ROUTE SELECTION
STATEMENT Select transportation routes to avoid heavily traveled roads and populated
areas when transporting nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION Reduces accident potential and radiological risks to the general
populace.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2. 3
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-007
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Facilities
OPERATION
Assembly and Checkout
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: ORDNANCE/ROCKET FACILITY RESTRICTIONS
STATEMENT Do not permit ordnance and disposal rocket motors in the nuclear assembly
and liquid metal servicing facilities.
JUSTIFICATION Prevent inadvertent explosions, detonations and fires which can lead
to nuclear hardware damage and nuclear hazards.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.5, 5.2. 7
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-009
GD-029
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-008
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM,
Ground Support
OPERATION
Transport Storage, Checkout
Handling
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: MINIMUM HANDLING OF REACTOR POWER MODULE
STATEMENT Provide GSE and procedures which minimize the handling required of the
reactor power module during prelaunch activities.
JUSTIFICATION The provision of GSE which minimize and simplified handling of the
powerplant reduces the chances of damage and accident potential during prelaunch.
Overall radiological risk of a "cold" powerplant is low. Equipment damage or injury
from other causes may be of greatest concern during prelaunch.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
The provision of a multiple usage shipping, checkout, storage and rating
transport trailer (transporter) should be considered. A cradle or transfer module sup-
porting the powerplant within the transporter could be used for horizontal, vertical and
horizontal to vertical operations and be made compatible with the booster or shuttle
cargo bay.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-L Sections, 5.2.3, 5.2.5
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-085
GO-002
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-009
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Isotopes
OPERATION
Checkout
MISSION PHASE^IVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: LAUNCH VEHICLE INTERFACE SIMULATION
STATEMENT Consider provision of launch vehicle electrical and mechanical interface
simulators for initial prelaunch tests within nuclear assembly facility.
JUSTIFICATION Reduce flight hardware damage and handling during integration.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Checks for alignment, roundness and interface compatibility. Particularly
important where large diameter circular surfaces are involved.
REFERENCES
72SD42 01-2-1 Section 5.2.5
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-065
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-010
PROGRAM EL.EMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Prelaunch Complex Tests
MISSION PHASE/EVENT Prelaunch
TITLE: REACTOR CRTTICALITY TEST
STATEMENT The important criticallty checks of the reactor and control system should
be performed at the contractor facility prior to shipment to the launch site. No criticality
tests should be run at the launch site. Full power tests of the flight reactor should be
avoided.
JUSTIFICATION The important criticality checks of the reactor are best performed in the
closely controlled and instrumented environment of the contractors facility. Operating
levels for these tests and any others should be held to a minimum to minimize the fission
product inventories of the reactor at the launch site.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS The possibility of only conducting low power criticality and control system
tests of the flight reactor should be considered where full power, and qualified tests would
be performed on other powerplants. 100 watt operation for 12 days will result in a very
low fission product inventory a few weeks after the test.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1
72SD42 01-3-2
Section 5.2.1, 5.2.5
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-011
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-011
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Prelaunch Testing
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE; PRELAUNCH TESTING OF REACTOR POWER MODULE
STATEMENT NO reactor power module criticality tests or power tests should be performed
at the launch center.
JUSTIFICATION Previous tests of qua! reactors and flight reactor at the contractors facility
should be designed to verify operation. Launch center facility requirements and radiation
hazards would be reduced.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Test program must provide assurance of reliable full power operation. Tests at
the launch center should concentrate on integrity, integration and functioning of control
and instrumentation systems.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.1, 5.2.5
72SD4201-3-2
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-005
GO-010
GO-012
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-012
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Prelaunch Checkout
MISSION PHASE/
Prelaunch
TITLE: RESTRICTION OF CONTROL DRUM MOVEMENT
STATEMENT Restrict control drum movement to a single drum during prelaunch checkout
where criticality tests are not performed.
JUSTIFICATION Prevents inadvertent criticality and subsequent nuclear radiation hazard.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Restriction may be incorporated into control drum lockout device.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.5
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-005
GO-011
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-013
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Launch Vehicle Integration
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: PRELAUNCH REACTOR POWER MODULE SIMULATION
STATEMENT Consider the use of a simulated power module for initial integration tests
of launch complex GSE and launch vehicle.
JUSTIFICATION Initial tests with a simulator will fulfill a majority of the initial launch
complex integration verification needs without subjecting a fueled nuclear power module.
Potential accidents and nuclear hazards will be reduced.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS simulated power module (mass, size and electrical circuits) could be used to
verify compatibility of GSE (transporter, test sets etc), launch complex systems (launch
vehicle interfaces, ML, cranes etc) and operations procedures.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.5
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-014
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Installation
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: POWER MODULE INSTALLATION LATE IN PRELAUNCH SEQUENCE
STATEMENT Consider installation of the PM late in the prelaunch sequence, possibly at
the launch pad, thus bypassing the VAB.
JUSTIFICATION Installation of the PM late in the sequence will minimize the accident
potential involved with the reactor power module during prelaunch operations. The
essentially "dormant" condition of the PM may permit late installation. Bypassing the VAB
would eliminate the additional nuclear and liquid metal hazards within that facility.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS A minimum amount of functional tests need to be performed on the PM while on
the launch vehicle. Tests prior to installation on the launch vehicle such as electrical
continuity, service arm compatibility could for the most part be performed with a PM
simulator.
REFERENCES
2SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2. 5
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-065
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72 I
NO.
GO-015
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Isotopes
OPERATION
Checkout, Storage
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch, All Phases
TITLE: PERIODIC CHECKOUT
STATEMENT Provide for periodic checkout and status monitoring while in storage.
JUSTIFICATION TO assure launch/logistic readiness over the mission lifetime.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Periodic checkout quarterly or semi annually.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-016
GO-067
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-016
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM, Isotopes
OPERATION
Storage, Checkout
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch, Orbital Operations
TITLE: READINESS STATE OF STORAGE REACTORS & ISOTOPES
STATEMENT The reactor power module and isotopes should be kept in a state of readiness
such that a replacement can be integrated with the launch vehicle within 2 days after requesl
from orbit. Total time from request to delivery in-orbit should be on the order of 15 days.
JUSTIFICATION Logs of power or operation on partial power in orbit-curtailing mission.
To provide minimum down time of operations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS power module could be stored in transporter, having previously and periodically
undergone status checks for readiness. Launch vehicle readiness is also required.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.4
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-015
GD085
GO-067
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-017
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Docking, Replacement, Disposal
MISSION PHASE /
Launch Ascent, Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: DUMMY POWER MODULE ORBITAL HANDLING OPERATIONS
STATEMENT Consider launch and orbital rendezvous, docking, maintenance, replacement
and disposal operations with dummy Reactor Power Module to minimize operational
accidents and verify procedures and hardware capability.
JUSTIFICATION Validation of procedures and hardware will reduce orbital accidents re-
sulting in crew hazards and eventual requirements for disposal or recovery of nuclear
hardware.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.5, 5. 3
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-018
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor Replacement or
Maintenance
MISSION PHASE^VENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: LOW POWER LEVEL OPERATION DURING REACTOR REPLACEMENT
STATEMENT Consider minimizing the reactor operating power level during the non
operating reactor replacement or maintenance.
JUSTIFICATION The studies of Section 7.3.3 of 72SD4201-2 indicate that radiation levels
in the vicinity of a non operating reactor due to the operation of the remaining reactor are
sufficiently low so as not to inhibit replacement or maintenance operations. However,
where general Space Vehicle operations are not adversily affected, consideration should be
given to reducing the power level and therefore the radiation level to the work crew.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 7.2.4, 7.3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-019
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Emergency Operation
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: EMERGENCY REACTOR PM OPERATION
STATEMENT Operation of a reactor PM at emergency levels (600 kWt) should be
restricted to an individual reactor to minimize the effects due to radiation.
JUSTIFICATION Radiation dose rates at increased reactor power levels increases. Opera-
tion of more than one reactor at emergency power levels may cause radiation dose rate
design limits to be exceeded.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Emergency operation power levels are usually designed to allow one reactor
to assume the entire load of the nominal two reactor Base for short periods of time.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 3.2.2, 3. 8. 2, 6.3
72SD4201-3-1 Section 2
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-020
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Maintenance & Repair
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: NO j^p^a OF UQUID METAL LINES
No attempt should be made to repair liquid metal (NaK) coolant loops/lines
during orbital operations.
JUSTIFICATION J3epair is not considered feasible due to the hazards involved in toxicity,
potential fire around 02 sources and radioactivity resulting from NaK activation.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Failure of liquid metal loop or loopswould either be tolerated by redundancy
or a replacement of the power module would be required.
REFERENCES
2SD4201-2-1 Section 3.8.2, 7.3.3
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-020
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-021
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: REPAIR RESTRICTIONS IN REACTOR GALLERY AREA
STATEMENT Repair in the reactor gallery area and around the reactor should not be
attempted.
JUSTIFICATION Repair in these areas is considered impractical and too hazardous due to
the high radiation levels that exist, even after reactor shutdown.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Components with repair frequencies less than the lifetime of the power module
should be placed in the engine room.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 3. 8.2, 7.3.3 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-014
GD-017
GD-018
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-022
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Maintenance and Repair
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT OF PM AFTER REACTOR SHUTDOWN
STATEMENT Consider allowing at least a 10-day wait period prior to initiating crew
activities involving the Shuttle or Tug around the shutdown reactor interface.
JUSTIFICATION Radiation levels immediately after shutdown around the reactor,
particularly near the gallery, are high, > 200 rem/hr. Radiation decay allows near
proximity work with the Shuttle crew about 10 days after shutdown, but distances and
loiter times must be restricted.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Additional crew shielding is required if repair or replacement is required
prior to the 10 day waiting period
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6, 3, 7.3.3 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-019
GO-035
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-023
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor PM
OPERATION
Reactor Re start
MISSION PHASE^VENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: SLOW DRUM MOVEMENT FOR RESTART
STATEMENT Consider moving reactor control drums at slow speed for a reactor
restart since criticality margins will not be known as precisely as at original startup.
JUSTIFICATION -jo avoid possible over reactive/over temperature conditions and possible
damage to the reactor power module.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 7.2.2, 7.3.4 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-024
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM . _Reactor PM, Ground Support,
Facilities
OPERATION
Ground Handling
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch, End of Mission/Recovery
TITLE! AVOIDANCE OF SUBSTANCES THAT REACT WITH LIQUID METALS
STATEMENT Avoid the use of materials, gases and liquids that are incompatible/ react
with liquid metals used in nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION Avoidance of reactive materials will reduce the potential for liquid metal
reactions resulting from leaks.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.6 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-025
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Isotopes
OPERATION
Ground Handling
MISSION PHASE
P relaunch
TITLE: IGNITABLE MATERIAL HAZARDS AROUND HEAT SOURCES
STATEMENT Prevent low temperature (~ 420°K) ignitable materials and gases from
approaching the radiating surfaces of the heat sources.
JUSTIFICATION TO reduce the possibility of igniting gases and materials used around the
heat source installation.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Consider use of inert cover gases, purges or other protective barriers.
REFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.2.5
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-078
RD-010
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-026
PROGRAM ELEMENT SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Space Base Isotopes
OPERATION
Space Base Integration
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch
TITLE: INTEGRATION OF ISOTOPES WITH SPACE BASE
STATEMENT Mate/ install and integrate isotope heat sources as late in the prelaunch
operations as feasible - perferrably at the launch pad.
JUSTIFICATION Prelaunch checkout activities in conjunction with a Space Base are limited.
Integration late in the prelaunch sequence will reduce the restrictive operations around
the source due to the thermal and radiation hazards and minimize the cooling requirements
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Consider isotope installation in the latter stages of the countdown - possibly
in conjunction with ordnance installation.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.5 CROSS REFERENCES
GO-002
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-027
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM- SU BSYSTEM
Crew Protection
OPERATION
Crew Rotation
[MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: CREW ROTATION PROCEDURES
STATEMENT Provide/establish crew rotation procedures in conformance with career
and periodic dose guidelines.
JUSTIFICATION Adherence to procedures combined with radiological monitoring of the crew
will prevent over dose to individual crew members and allow effective scheduling and use
of the crew.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-053
GD-054
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-028
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection
OPERATION
EVA
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: EVA RESTRICTIONS THROUGH SOUTH ATLANTIC ANOMALY
STATEMENT Restrict EVA during orbits intercepting the South Atlantic anomaly.
JUSTIFICATION Normal EVA operations result in radiation dose rates a factor of 2 greater
than when shielded by a 1.6 g/cm2 spacecraft. Intersections through the intense South
Atlantic anomaly regions can result in dose rates at least 2 orders of magnitude greater.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Orbits intersecting the South Atlantic anomaly vary in accordance to altitude
and inclination. A nominal 55° with 500 KM orbit intersects the South Atlantic anomaly
~ 1 out of 5 orbits. Planned EVA can thus reduce the accumulated dose to the crew
members concerned.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2~1 Section 6.3.1 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-029
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection, Reactor PM
OPERATION
EVA
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: EVA RESTRICTIONS DUE TO REACTOR RADIATION
STATEMENT Restrict EVA in the vicinity of the Reactor Power Module due to the
increased nuclear radiation environment.
JUSTIFICATION Radiation levels (depending on operation and design features) may be
significantly higher near the PM and particularly near the upper portion of the shield
(dose rates 2 to 3 orders of magnitude greater than the interior of the Base). Dose rates
are very dependent on position and restrictions of position can minimize dose received.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS The dose rates around a reactor are highly dependent on the shield design
and operating level of the reactor.
REFERENCES 72SD 4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-040
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-030
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTE M- SU BSYSTE M
Crew Protection, Reactor PM
OPERATION
EVA
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: EVA RESTRICTIONS DUE TO PM THERMAL RADIATION
STATEMENT Restrict EVA in the vicinity of the Power Module radiators due to the
thermal radiation environment.
JUSTIFICATION Radiator surface temperatures can range from 350° to over 800°K and
present a hazard to the crew and cause suit damage.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-031
PROGRAM -ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection
OPERATION
EVA
MISSION PHASE yfeVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: EVA COORDINATION WITH RSO
STATEMENT Coordinate EVA with the Radiological Safety Office to ensure safe EVA
environment at the time of implementation.
JUSTIFICATION The RSO must be informed of impending Solar Flares, accumulated
radiation doses and anticipated doses, so is in a position to determine individuals and
times most appropriate for EVA operations. Considered important to maintain
radiation doses within allowable limits
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1, 7.3.1 CROSS REFERENCESGO-048
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-032
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection, Reactor PM
OPERATION
EVA
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: EVA RESTRICTIONS WITH NaK LEAKS
STATEMENT Avoid EVA when NaK leaks are suspected.
JUSTIFICATION NaK can be corrosive to many materials and should not be subjected to
an O environment.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.2 CROSS REFERENCESGD-032
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-033
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEMCrew Protection, Interfacing
Vehicles
OPERATION
Rendezvous and Docking
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: IMPLEMENTATION OF APPROACH AND LOITER OPERATIONS
STATEMENT Advantage should be taken of the particular shielding characteristics in
implementing approach and loiter operations. Restrictions ishould also be placed on
approach distances and attitudes.
JUSTIFICATION Radiation levels around the shield vary with the square root of the distance
and also vary dramatically with position around the shield due to its shape. Loiter and
approaches within the low radiation zones can reduce doses received. Restrictions will
prevent undue exposure of personnel and equipment.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1 CROSS REFERENCESGD-040
GO-035
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-034
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMCrew Protection, Interfacing
Vehicles
OPERATION
Rendezvous
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: MAINTENANCE OF NOMINAL BRAKING GATE VELOCITIES
STATEMENT Nominal braking gate velocities of rendezvous and docking vehicles should
be maintained so as to not increase the radiation doses in the vicinity of nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION This guideline is specifically applicable when rendezvous corridors bring
the Shuttle or Tug in the near vicinity of the operating reactor power modules.
Accumulated doses are well within allowable limits if braking gate velocities are
maintained.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-035
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection, Interfacing
Vehicles
OPERATION
Rendezvous and Docking
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: LOITER TIME CONSTRAINTS
STATEMENT Minimize the loiter time in the vicinity of high radiation areas such as the
reactor power modules.
JUSTIFICATION Although nuclear sources can be shielded such that radiation levels on all
sides are very low, it is common practice to optimize the shield design to allow higher
radiation levels in areas away from crew/hardware areas. Crew-and logistic-vehicle
loiter time in these high radiation areas must be strictly controlled to minimize the total
dose received.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1 CROSS REFERENCESGD-040
GO-033
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-036
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Crew Protection, Interfacing
Vehicle - Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingency Operation
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: PROMPT CREW RESCUE
STATEMENT Consider the prompt rescue of the entire Space Base crew.
JUSTIFICATION Remote but severe accidents involving a reactor excursion or collision
in orbit could result in a very high radiation environment on and around the Space Base.
Such a condition may necessitate early abandonment.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Rescue could involve the removal within a few hours or possibly a few days
of the entire crew of 50 to 60.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.2 CROSS REFERENCESGO-037
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-037
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMCrew Protection, Interfacing
Vehicle - Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingency Operation - Rescue
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: CREW RESCUE OPERATIONS
STATEMENT Perform crew rescue upon decision of the Radiation Safety Officer and
Mission Control when radiation levels in around the Base are intolerable.
JUSTIFICATION- Remote but severe situations could result which require plans for rescue
of the entire crew to minimize total radiation doses to the crew which exceed tolerable
levels.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Large crews will require the use of an extensive rescue capability.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.2 CROSS REFERENCES
GO-036
GO-048
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-038
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEMExperiments, Interfacing
Vehicle (KNS)
OPERATION
RNS Operations
MISSION PHASE/4VENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: RNS APPROACH CONSIDERATIONS
STATEMENT Consider the RNS approach and departure trajectories in selecting detached
module deployment position.
JUSTIFICATION RNS radiation effects can result in dynamic interference of experiments.
Dynamic interference can be minimized if deployment position considers effects of
approaches and departures of the RNS.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1.4 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-039
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments, Crew Protection,
Interfacing Vehicles
OPERATION
Approach, Rendezvous and
Docking
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: APPROACH CORRIDORS WITH INTERFACING VEHICLES
STATEMENT Establish and maintain adequate/ safe approach corridors with interfacing
vehicles employing nuclear sources to minimize exposure of the crew and experiment
interference.
JUSTIFICATION • Interfacing vehicles such as the Reusable Nuclear Shuttle can present a
significant radiation hazard. Attitude position of shielding and operating condition are
important in minimizing dose to the Space Base. Approach restrictions should account
for potential failure conditions.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS- Approach corridor limits are dependent on the nuclear source, operating
condition etc. In some instances (RNS) an approach limit of hundreds of Km may be
required during thrusting operations.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-040
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Experiments
OPERATIONExperiment Module
Deployment
/EVIMISSION PHASE ENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: EXPERIMENT MODULE DEPLOYMENT TRAJECTORY
STATEMENT Plan experiment "free flying" module deployment trajectory to minimize
approach to and loiter time around the high radiation areas around the Base reactors.
JUSTIFICATION Experiments may encounter dynamic interference and also substantial
film fogging while in the high radiation areas around the reactors.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS' Trajectories should be planned to make maximum use of reactor shadow
shielding and if possible rendezvous from the end of the Base apposite from the reactors.
EFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6. 3.1.4, 3.8.2 CROSS REFERENCESGO-033
GD-074
GD-075
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-041
PROGRAM ELEMENT SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Space Base Experiments
OPERATIONOrbital Activities, Radiation
Screening
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: EXPERIMENT SCREENING PROCEDURES
STATEMENT. Provide experiment data screening procedures for experiments sensitive
to South Atlantic anomaly interference.
JUSTIFICATION: Where data is required through the South Atlantic anomaly certain
screening techniques would be required.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1.4 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-073
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-042
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments
OPERATION
Orbital Activities, Experiment
Shutdown
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: CURTAILMENT OF EXPERIMENT OPERATION
STATEMENT . Qons^er curtaiiijig experiment operation through major portions of the
South Atlantic anomaly and portions of the polar regions.
JUSTIFICATION' Radiation energy levels in the South Atlantic anomaly are such that
significant experiment dynamic interference can result and therefore considerable
data degradation is expected.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Typical of the experiments listed in the NASA "Blue Book" which could
be effected by the South Atlantic anomaly are FPE's 5.1, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.11,
5.17, 5.21, 5.22, 5.24 and 5.26.
IEFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1.4 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-043
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiments, Interfacing
Vehicles
OPERATION
Experiment Operation
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: PLANNED EXPERIMENT INTERFERENCE FROM INTERFACING VEHICLES
STATEMENT Intermittent experiment interference must be anticipated and planned for
when relatively high radiation source interfacing vehicles are in operation in the vicinity
of the Base.
JUSTIFICATION
It would be uneconomical and quite unfeasible to design for the elimination
of experiment interference under all operational conditions.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: A thrusting RNS can cause some experiment interference at distances up to
18 - 19000 Km from the Base.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-044
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMExperiment, Dynamic Rad. Gen OPERATION
Experiment Operations
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS - DYNAMIC RAD GENERATORS
STATEMENT Provide procedural restrictions in the operation of dynamic radiation
generators and the location and movement of personnel in the vicinity during operation.
JUSTIFICATION • streaming can result from operation of X-ray equipment and the
like. Restrictions in operation and location of personnel can eliminate inadvertant
exposures.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS. Operational restrictions should be combined with design features which
locate habitation quarters and sensitive equipment in suitable areas.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1, 6.3.2 CROSS REFERENCESGD-076
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-045
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Experiment, Navigation and
Control, Interfacing Vehicle
OPERATION
Orbital Activities,
Rendezvous and Docking
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: LASER BEAM OPERATION RESTRICTIONS
STATEMENT prOvide restrictive procedures (location, viewing, and operation) during
the operation of laser equipment in and around the Space Base.
JUSTIFICATION- Concentrated light from laser beam sources can damage the eye retina.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
Base.
Laser equipment could be located on interfacing vehicles as well as on the
REFERENCES 72SD42oi-2-l Section 6.3.1 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-055
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-046
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMExperiments, Communication
and Data Management
OPERATION
Resupply
MISSION PHASE/fevENT
Orbital Operations
TITLE: PHOTO FILM/ EMULSION RESUPPLY
STATEMENT provide regular/periodic resupply of photographic film and emulsions.
JUSTIFICATION Noticeable film fogging occurs with high speed film ASA 400 stored in
20g/cm2 shielding in approximately 25 to 50 days. Storage time of slower film planned
for up to 200 days.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Data assumes threshold fogging limits. If considerable logging can oe
permitted (reduction of resolution and contrast) storage times could be extended.
Note: Processed film is not governed by this guideline. However, exposed film as
well as unexposed is affected by radiation.
EFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1.4 CROSS REFERENCESGD-070
GD-071
GO-047
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-047
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEMExperiments, Communication
and Data Management
OPERATION
Re supply
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations
TITLE: HIGH SPEED FILM RESUPPLY AFTER INTENSE SOLAR FLARE
STATEMENT Provide for the entire replacement of the high speed film (ASA> 400)
supply after an intense solar flare.
JUSTIFICATION An intense solar flare event can wipe out the entire high speed film supply
in orbit. Additional shielding above the 20g/ cm provided in the storage containers has
little effect.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 6.3.1.4, 3.8.1
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-046
GD-070
GD-071
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-048
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
MCC, Reactor PM, Isotopes,
Ground Support
OPERATION
Operations
MISSION PHASE
Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: MCC SUPPORT DURING MISSION
STATEMENT Consider the continual attended support of the mission by the MCC.
JUSTIFICATION ' To provide logistics requirements, failure diagnosis and rescue
operations - minimizing radiation hazards to the crew and general populace.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
EFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.3.4, 5.4.3 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-013
GD-027
GD-028
GD-041
GD-048
GD-059
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-049
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SVSTE M- SU BSYSTEM
Navigation and Control
OPERATIONLoiter, Rendezvous,
Docking
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch Ascent, Orbital Operations, EOM
TITLE: LOITER AND TRAVERSE OPERATIONS RESTRICTED NEAR PM
STATEMENT Minimize the loiter and traverse operations near the reactor and PM
radiators to reduce potential radiation and thermal interference with navigational
equipment.
JUSTIFICATION Radiation and IR interference can cause possible loss of control or
guidance errors giving rise to potential collisions.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-l Section 6.3.1.3 CROSS REFERENCESGD-084
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-050
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
MCC, Range Safely, Reactor
PM. Isotopes
OPERATION
Reentry
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Launch/A scent, End of Mission
TITLE: ADVANCED WARNING OF NUCLEAR IMPACT
STATEMENT Provide determination of potential impact are as, technical and hazard
data and advanced warnings of nuclear hardware impact to proper recovery team and
governmental authorities.
JUSTIFICATION
personnel.
To take necessary safing actions and reduce potential hazards to
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
EFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.5 CROSS REFERENCESGD-011
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-051
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Interfacing Vehicle - Space
Shuttle, Reactor PM, Isotopes
OPERATION
Disposal, Recovery
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
End of Mission/Recovery
ITITLE: SHUTTLE RECOVERY MODE
STATEMENT Consider use of Space Shuttle as a prime or backup mode of disposal/
retrieval/ recovery of nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION Provide contingency support and reduce mission risk to personnel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.5
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, 4, 5
72SD4201-4-2
CROSS REFERENCESRD-004 RO-004
RD-006 RO-005
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-052
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
MCC, Range Safety
OPERATION
Range Tracking
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Launch/Ascent, Orbital Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: TRACKING NETWORK ADDITIONS
STATEMENT . Consider additional tracking, command and telemetry network capability
for missions in 55° inclination orbits.
JUSTIFICATION' To provide adequate tracking/ command and control.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
EFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.3.4 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-053
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Range Safety, Reactor PM,
Isotopes
OPERATION
Flight Termination
MISSION PHASE
Launch/ Ascent
TITLE: SAFING s-n OBSTRUCT SYSTEM
STATEMENT Consider safing the S-II destruct system as Eurasian overfly is made with
a nuclear pay load.
JUSTIFICATION Mgy re(juce nuciear hardware impact potential and release of
radioactive material on the Eurasian continent.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.3.2 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-054
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
8 VSTE M- BU B SYSTE M
Range Safety, Reactor PM,
Isotooes
OPERATION
Flight Termination
MISSION PHASE/£VENT
Launch/ Ascent
TITLE: COMMAND DESTRUCT DELAY
STATEMENT Consider a command destruct delay to allow separation of the nuclear
payload prior to stage destruct.
JUSTIFICATION : Reduces potential of releasing radioactive material due to stage
explosion and subsequent fragmentation.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.3.2 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-055
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Range Safety, Reactor PM
OPERATION
Flight Termination
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/ Ascent
TITLE: FLIGHT TERMINATION IMPACT AREAS
STATEMENT Consider flight termination impact areas of a reactor power module
outside the continental shelf-preferrably in deep ocean areas.
JUSTIFICATION . Reduce possibility of quasi-steady-state operation and release of
radiation which presents hazards to the ecology (fish) and general populace.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.3.2 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-056
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Range Safety, Reactor PM,
Isotopes
OPERATION
Launch and Ascent
MISSION
Launch/ Ascent
TITLE: LAUNCH AZMIUTH RESTRICTIONS
STATEMENT Land overflight during the launch/ ascent phase should be minimized.
Semi-polar launches over central and Southern Florida and Cuba should not be allowed.
JUSTIFICATION To minimize the radiation hazards (risks) to the general populace.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS A southerly launch with dogleg should be considered to avoid overfly of the
Eurasian continent.
EFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.3.2 CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-057
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Space Base
SVSTEM- SUBSYSTEMRange Safety, Reactor PM,
Isotopes
OPERATION
Launch
MISSION PHASE
Launch/ Ascent
TITLE: WEATHER RESTRICTIONS FOR LAUNCH
STATEMENT Launches of nuclear hardware at KSC should be scheduled with prevailing
winds blowing away from populated areas (preferrably out to sea).
JUSTIFICATION Reduce radiation hazard potential to the general populace around KSC.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
REFERENCES
72 SD4201-2 -1 Section 5.3.2
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-05 8
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Ground Support
OPERATION
Prelaunch Operations
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Pre launch
TITLE: NUCLEAR PROCEDURES AT LAUNCH SITE
STATEMENT Provide nuclear hardware launch site procedures in the KSC Ground
Safety Plan (K-V-053)
JUSTIFICATION' Incorporate nuclear safety procedures into overall KSC operations to
reduce possibility of accidents involving nuclear hardware and assure proper operations
and handling when nuclear hardware is present.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
EFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.5, 5.3 CROSS REFERENCES
GD-087
RD-011
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-059
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Ground Support Facilities
OPERATION
Fire Protection
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: TRAINED FIRE FIGHTING PERSONNEL
STATEMENT Provide well trained personnel with considerable actual liquid metal fire
fighting practice and under simulated conditions.
JUSTIFICATION Provide best efficiency possible to isolate and quickly contain the fire.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Configuration is important and may present a difficult fire extinguishing
position. Extinguishing agents should be applied carefully to prevent splashing. Complete
coverage of the liquid metal is mandatory.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.6
CROSS REFERENCES
GD-092
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-060
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Ground Support, Facilities
OPERATION
Operations in Facilities
MISSION PHASE/&VENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: MULTIPLE ESCAPE ROUTES
STATEMENT Provide and designate multiple escape (exit) routes within facilities in the
case of nuclear emergencies.
JUSTIFICATION Reduce dose to personnel in working areas in case of nuclear accidents
which release radiation. More than one exit should be available in case of exit blockage.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS Protective measures include escape provisions, and the use of protective
clothing and respiratory equipment.
EFERENCES
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.5, 5.2.6, 5.2.7
CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-061
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTE M- SU BSYSTEM
Ground Support, Facilities
OPERATION
Ground Handling
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission/ Recovery
TITLE: USE OF PROPER CLOTHING AND PROTECTION EQUIPMENT
STATEMENT Provide proper protective clothing, respiratory and first aid equipment
for work around nuclear and liquid metal hardware.
JUSTIFICATION prevent contamination, thermal burns, and reactions with liquid metal
components.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS'
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Sections CROSS REFERENCES
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-062
PROGRAM ELEMENT SYSTE M- SU BSYSTEM
Space Base Ground Support, Facilities
OPERATION
General
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission/ Recovery
TITLE: SMOKING AND EATING REGULATIONS
STATEMENT Provide regulations, warnings and control of smoking and eating in
designated nuclear areas.
JUSTIFICATION • Smoking and eating should not be permitted when nuclear material has
been handled or has been dispersed into the area and surrounding atmosphere due to
inhalation and ingestion potential. Under normal circumstances, smoking and eating
can be allowed when and where designated.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
EFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5 CROSS REFERENCESRO-001
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-063
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Ground Support, Facilities
OPERATION
Ground Operations
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission/ Recovery
TITLE: USE OF TWO MAN "BUDDY" SYSTEM
STATEMENT Consider the use of the two man "buddy" system in operations with
nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION To reduce chances of nuclear accidents and over exposure of
personnel. The buddy system provides a rescue capability and additional monitoring
of hazardous situations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS' Two man "buddy" system would require the use of at least two trained
personnel in a facility or near operations involving nuclear hardware. One of the men
could be monitoring radiation if procedures require it.
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.5 CROSS REFERENCESGO-001
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-064
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Ground Support, Facilities
OPERATION
Ground Operations
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission
TITLE: GROUND SUPPORT RADIATION DOSIMETRY PROCEDURES
STATEMENT Provide procedures for the implementation of radiological monitoring
and control during all ground operations involving nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION • provide tabulation of radiation doses and prevent over exposures.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.6, 5.3.3 CROSS REFERENCESRD-011
GD-087
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-065
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SVSTE M- SU BSYSTE M
Facilities, Reactor PM,Isotopes
OPERATION
Prelaunch Checkout and
Integration
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: CHECKOUT AND INTEGRATION IN VAB
STATEMENT Conduct a. thorough evaluation of the necessity and desirability of integrating
and testing of nuclear hardware within the VAB.
JUSTIFICATION ' Limited checkout of nuclear hardware is required with the Launch Vehicle.
Avoidance of activities in the VAB would eliminate accident potential nuclear hazards and
the need of providing nuclear support requirements within that facility.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5. 2.5, 5.2.7
CROSS REFERENCES
GO-014
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-066
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SVSTEM— SUBSYSTEM
Facilities, Reactor PM,
Isotopes
OPERATION
Storage
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch
STORAGE AREA IN NUCLEAR ASSEMBLY BUILDINGITITLE:
STATEMENT Consider use of the nuclear assembly building as the prime nuclear
hardware storage facility.
JUSTIFICATION within controlled facility and minimize handling and transportation.
Makes best use of nuclear trained personnel and nuclear facilties.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS' Storage can be separated from checkout and assembly bays.
EFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.4, 5.2.7 CROSS REFERENCESGD-094
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-067
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Space Base
SYSTE M— SU BSYSTEM
Facilities, Reactor PM,
Isotopes
OPERATION
Storage
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch and All Phases
TITLE: STORAGE LIFETIMES
STATEMENT Consider provisions for the storage of mission nuclear hardware from a
few months to several years.
JUSTIFICATION Required for orbital replacement over a typical 10-year mission.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS
REFERENCES 72SD4201-2-1 Section 5.2.4 CROSS REFERENCESGO-015
GO-016
CONVERSION FACTORS
INTERNATIONAL TO ENGLISH UNITS
Physical Quantity
Acceleration
Area
Density
Energy
Force
Length
Mass
Power
Pressure
Speed
Temperature
Volume
International
Units English Units
/ 2 ... 2m/sec ft/sec
m2 ft2
in2
Kg/m2 lb/ft3
lb/in3
Joule Btu
Newton Ibf
m ft
nm
Kg Ibm
watt Btu/ sec
Btu/min
Btu/hr
Newton/m2 Atmosphere
lbf/m2
lbf/ft2
m/sec ft/sec (fps)
K F
m3 in3
Conversion Factor
Multiply By
3.281
10.764
1550.39
6.242 x 10"2
3.610 x 10~5
9.479 x 10"4
2.248 x 10'1
3.281
5.399 x 10~
2.205
9.488x ID"4
5.691 x 10~2
3.413
3.413
1.451 x lO"4
2.088X 10-2
3.281
(9/5 -459.67/tK)
6.097 x 104
35.335
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Abort
Accident
Airborne Material
Breached
Bulk Damage (Radiation)
Contamination
Control Drum Motion
Core Compaction
Cover Gas
Credible
Cnticality
Critical Mass
Cumulative Probability
Damaged
Decontamination
Destructive Excursion
Disassembly/Disassembled
Disposal
Distributed Material
Dose Guidelines
Dosimetry
Premature and abrupt termination of an event or mission because of existing or imminent
degradation or failure of hardware. (In the safety analysis, no distinction is made between
an accident and abort.)
An undesirable unplanned event which may or may not result from a system failure or mal-
function.
Radioactive gases, vapors and participates released to the air.
Fuel elements, coolant loops, pressure vessel, core, or radiation shield are (a) physically
torn by thermal or mechanical stresses, (b) cut open by fragmentation or (c) split open by
internal pressures.
Radiation causing atomic displacement in semiconductor devices - sometimes commonly
referred to as "crystal" damage.
A condition where a radioactive material is mixed or adheres to a desirable substance or
where radioactivity has spread to places where it may harm persons, experiments or make
areas unsafe
Rotation of the control drums or drum toward or away from the most reactive position within
a reactor. (As used in safety analysis results in a reactor excursion )
The act of increasing the density of the core which results in increased reactivity and possible
criticality
A gas blanket used to provide an inert atmospheric environment around hardware to minimize
potential reactions which can give rise to accident situations.
An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurence of > 10~12.
The act of obtaining and sustaining a chain reaction
The mass of fissionable material necessary to obtain criticality
Sometimes referred to as "Mission probability" is the overall probability of a sequence of
events occurring (product of "relative probabilities" of the individual events along a path of
an abort sequence tree)
Same as "Breached".
The removal of undesired dispersed radioactive substances from material, personnel, rooms,
equipment, air, etc. (e g , washing, filtering, chipping).
An excursion (safety analysis assumes ~ 100 MW-sec) accompanied by a complete disassembly
of the reactor, a prompt radiation emission and release of fission product gases, vapors and
participates.
Nuclear hardware (e g , reactor) which has been violently broken or separated into parts and
not capable of forming a critical mass.
The planned discarding or recovery of nuclear hardware
The spread of nuclear fuel and radioactive debris on the earth's surface following impact or
destructive excursion
Established radiation levels used in the nuclear safety analysis for evaluating number of
exposures and in determining operating limits and boundaries.
Techniques used in the measurement of radiation
II
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Dynamic Interference
Early Reactor Disposal
Electrical Power System
End of Mission
Excursion
Exposure Limit
Fission Products
Fuel
Fuel Element/Capsule
Fuel Element Ablation
Fuel Element Burial
Gallery
Ground Deposited Particles
Hazard
Hazard Source
Immediate Reentry
Impact in Deep Ocean
Impact in Reservoir
Impact in Water Containing
Edible Marine Life
Intact Reentry/Reactor
Integrated/Cumulative Dose
Interfacing Vehicle
An experiment radiation effect where the flux rate above some threshold (a fraction of the ex-
periment signal-to-noise ratio at maximum sensitivity, for electronic detectors) causes
noticeable degradation of data quality
Attempted disposal of the reactor prior to its successful completion of 5 years operational
lifetime.
All components (heat source, regulation, control, power conversion and radiators) necessary
for the development of electrical power. The reactor electrical power system includes all
hardware associated with the Power Module with the exception of the Disposal System
Generally associated with the termination of the mission or flight. Is also used to define those
activities involved with disposal and recovery of hardware after intended lifetime
A rapid and usually unplanned increase in thermal power associated with the operation of a
power reactor
Total accumulated or time dependent radiation exposure limits imposed on personnel by regula
tory agencies or limits which preclude equipment damage.
The nuclides (quite often radioactive) produced by the fission of a heavy element nucllde such
as U-235 or Pu-239.
Fissionable material in a reactor or radioisotopes in a heat source used in producing energy
A shaped body of nuclear fuel prepared for use in a reactor or heat source Common usage
involves some form of encapsulation
Fuel element clad and/or fuel removed by reentry heating, releasing fission products to the
atmosphere
Individual fuel elements beneath the ground surface completely covered by soil
The compartment of the reactor shield which houses the major primary loop components
Particles deposited on the ground from radioactive fallout
An existing situation caused by an unsafe act or condition which can result in harm or
damage to personnel and equipment
The location and/or origin of the hazard
Very early reentry of the reactor (e g , misaligned thrust vector which causes firing of the
reactor disposal rockets toward earth resulting in 1-2 day reentry)
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in the ocean, beyond the Continental Shelf where
contamination of the food chain is extremely remote
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in reservoir containing potable drinking water
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material on the Continental Shelf or In a body of
water such as a lake, river or stream where contamination of the food chain is likely.
A nuclear system that retains its integrity upon impact and in the case of a reactor is capable
of undergoing an excursion.
The total dose resulting from all or repeated exposures to radiation
Any defined module, spacecraft, booster or logistic vehicle which may have an interaction
with the Manned Space Base.
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lonization Damage
Land Impact
Loss of Coolant
Mission Support
Moderator
NaK-78
No Discernible Hazard
Non-credible
Non-destructive Excursion
Normal Operations
Over Moderation
Permanent Shutdown
Poison
Power Module
Premature Reentry
Pre-poison
Prompt Radiation
Quasi-Steady State
Radiological Consequences
Radiological Hazards
Radiological Risk
Random Reentry
Reactivity
Radiation causing surface damage in materials (e.g., the fogging of film)
Nuclear hardware which impacts land at terminal velocities following reentry and lower velo-
cities during prelaunch or early in the launch/ascent phase.
Loss of organic or liquid metal coolant in reactor coolant loops due to failure/accident
Supporting functions provided the Space Base Program by ground personnel and Interfacing
vehicles throughout all mission phases.
Material used In a nuclear reactor to slow down neutrons from the high energies at which they
are released to increase the probability of neutron capture. Water and hydrogen are modera-
tors In a thermal reactor.
An alloy of sodium (22% by weight) and potassium (78%) used as a liquid metal heat transfer
fluid.
Represents no hazard to the general populace
An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurrence of < 10" . Considered
not worthy of concern.
A temperature excursion which may rupture the primary coolant loop and release fission pro-
ducts to the environment but - leaves the reactor shield essentially intact.
Planned and anticipated mission activities and events
Immersion of reactor in an hydrogenous medium (moderator) resulting in increased neutron
reflection into the core causing a reactor excursion
Enacting provisions which preclude reactor criticality under all foreseeable circumstances.
A material that absorbs neutrons and reduces the reactivity of a reactor
The complete reactor/shield, radiator, power conversion system and disposal system unit as
provided on the Space Base
Any reentry of the reactor from Earth orbit with orbital lifetimes less than the planned (1167
year) orbital decay time of the 990 km disposal altitude.
A poison which is added to the reactor fuel for purposes of controlling reacticlty. Sometimes
referred to as "burnable poison"
The neutron and gamma radiation released coincident with the fission process as opposed to the
radiation from fission product decay. Commonly associated with an excursion event.
A term used to describe the condition when a reactor periodically goes critical and then sub-
critical due to water surging in and out of the core
The radiation exposure effect on personnel and the ecology from a radiation release accident or
event
Hazards associated with radiation as differentiated from other sources.
The term used to define the average number of people anticipated to be affected by radiation
In a given mission or phase thereof
The uncontrolled non-directed reentry of a vehicle from orbit.
A measure of the departure of a reactor from critical such that positive values correspond to
reactors super-critical and negative values to reactors which are sub-critical (Usually ex-
pressed in multiples of a dollar )
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Reactor Fails to Survive Reentry
Reactor Survives Reentry
Reactor/Shield
Relative. Probability
Repair /Replacement
Ruptured
Safety
Safety Catastrophic
Safety Critical
Safety Marginal
Safety Negligible
Scram System
System Safety
Space Base Program
Space Debris
Space Shuttle
Source Terms
Tracer
Reactor/shield is completely disassembled by reentry heating, releasing individual fuel ele-
ments and structural debris to the atmosphere.
Reactor is not disassembled by reentry heating, radiation shield may be damaged
A system containing the reactor, control drums, gallery and surrounding LiH and Tungsten
shield.
Probability of the occurrence of a particular event given a defined set of choices
Consists of (a) physically repairing all faulty systems, or (b) complete replacement of the
faulty system(s).
Same as "Breached".
Freedom from chance of injury or loss to personnel, equipment or property
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will severely degrade system perform-
ance, and cause subsequent system loss, death, or multiple injuries to personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will cause equipment damage or per-
sonnel injury, or will result in a hazard requiring immediate corrective action for personnel
or system survival (SPD-1A).
Condition^ such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem failure or component malfunction will degrade system perform-
ance but which can be counteracted or controlled without major damage or any injury to
personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that personnel error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or
subsystem failure or component malfunction will not result in minor system degradation and
will not produce system functional damage or personnel injury (SPD-1A).
A separate, possibly automatic, mechanism used to rapidly shut down a reactor.
The optimum degree of risk management within the constraints of operational effectiveness,
time and cost attained through the application of management and engineering principles
throughout all phases of a program.
All aspects of the Space Base mission including all prime and support hardware and personnel
both on the ground, at sea or in orbit, which are required throughout all mission phases.
Uncontrolled radioactive or non-radioactive man-made objects in space, these objects may
present collision and radiation hazards to earth orbital missions.
The manned vehicle used for the transportation of cargo to and from earth orbit. A sepa-
rately launched vehicle (booster) on which the Shuttle is placed provides the initial first
stage thrust.
Characterization of a radiation hazard with regard to (a) location, (b) magnitude, and
(c) exposure mode.
Material in which isotopes of an element may be incorporated to make possible observation
of the course of the element through a chemical, biological or physical process.
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